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This dissertation includes three essays that examine the interactions between
financial arrangements and product market outcomes in the health care industry the-
oretically and empirically. Integrating finance and health economic theories, particu-
larly the coexistence of mixed ownerships and the private provision of public goods,
my dissertation presents unique opportunities to explore the interaction of the fields
of health care finance and industrial organization.
Chapter 2 includes an evaluation of nursing home quality, which provides
a valuable opportunity to clarify the cyclical fluctuation of quality and the role of
financial constraints in explaining such fluctuation. As such, I use local unemployment
rates to provide exogenous cost shocks. During recessions, lower labor costs ease
financial constraints and thus lead to higher nurse staffing, lower employee turnover,
and better quality. Such counter-cyclical quality fluctuation is most profound among
financially constrained facilities that tend to be more leveraged. This counter-cyclical
quality is also more pronounced among nursing homes that are for-profit, belong to
multi-facility chains, and focus largely on Medicaid residents. Overall, I find that
financial constraints hinder quality, nursing home quality is counter-cyclical, and
financial constraints slightly amplify counter-cyclical quality fluctuations.
Chapter 3 examines the impacts of financial leverage on hospitals technology
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adoptions. To account for the potential endogeneity between financing and producing
decisions, the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate is used as an exogenous financial
shock that crowds out hospitals financial resources. Surprisingly, I did not find sig-
nificant results to identify the association between financial leverage and technology
adoption.
Using a unique 8-year nursing home CEOs compensation dataset, I make
inferences of the objective functions of for-profit and not-for-profit organizations,
particularly the differential weights of financial and altruistic (quality) performance.
Surprisingly, I find that compensation is not tied to performance. Rather, managers
are compensated for more concrete measures including the size of the nursing home,
payer-mix, and manager experience. I further separate managers into three groups
(not-for-profit managers, for-profit and owner-managers, and for-profit and non-owner
managers). Among these three types of managers, I find consistently significant
evidence that owner-managers earn significantly higher compensation than do the
other two types of managers.
The center theme of this volume is to address the public good perspective
of corporate finance decisions (e.g. capital structure and corporate governance). In
health care industries, these finance issues can have strong influences on public wel-
fare, in quality of care and services provisions. On the other hand, the mix of own-
ership types and the incomplete quality information provide health care markets as
unique opportunities to examine financial principles in a different setting.
2
CHAPTER II
Financial Constraints and Counter-Cyclical
Nursing Home Quality
Financial constraints occur when a firm faces limited access to external fi-
nancing resources because of either high cost of capital (price rationing) or shortage of
credit supply (quantity rationing). When a firm is financially constrained, it becomes
more dependent on internal cash flows. This dependency may affect its investment
and production decisions. A recent study by Campello and colleagues (2010) shows
that financially constrained firms are more likely to cut capital and marketing ex-
penditures, technology investment, and number of employees. Perhaps due to the
difficulty of measuring and quantifying quality differences, the impacts of financial
constraints on product and service quality are dimensions that are less frequently
discussed in the literature. Financial constraints are also viewed as an important
accelerator that amplifies cyclical economic fluctuations. Bernanke and colleagues
(1996) theorize that financial constraints amplify modest monetary shocks to large
pro-cyclical fluctuations of investments and outputs. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)
and Khanna and Tice (2004) provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that
financial constraints explain and exacerbate counter-cyclical markups in the super-
market industry. This paper extends the literature to investigate the importance of
financial constraints by identifying their impact on the counter-cyclical behaviors of
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nursing home quality, a context in which the consumers can not perfectly observe
service quality but do bear significant switching costs. The result also provides an
alternative explanation for counter-cyclical health outcomes that were observed by
Ruhm (2000) and Stevens et al.(2011).
Nursing homes play important roles in providing necessary care to institutional-
ized elderly and adults with impaired functionality. However, such important roles
can be compromised if the homes are financially constrained. Nursing facilities have
several characteristics that mark them as likely to be financially constrained. Whited
and Wu(2006) conclude that the firms that are smaller, have low or no research cover-
age by equity analysts, and do not have corporate bond ratings are more likely to be
financially constrained. Most nursing homes satisfy these criteria. In addition, Jaffee
and Russell (1976), Keeton(1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1987), and Whited (1992) view
information asymmetry between the lenders and the borrowers as a primary cause of
financial constraints and credit rationing. Asymmetric quality information between
nursing facilities and creditors can hinder the creditors’ willingness to provide inex-
pensive and long-term capital to the nursing facilities. Asymmetric information rein-
forces the effects of unfavorable firm characteristics and subsequently causes nursing
homes to face stricter limitations to external capital. Asymmetric quality information
has another impact on the product market. As noted by Arrow (1963), information
asymmetry is the prominent characteristic of the medical care market and often leads
to loss of consumer welfare. Information asymmetry can distort the incentives of
financially constrained nursing homes to provide socially optimal quality. The ef-
fects of asymmetric information on both credit and product markets make nursing
homes more vulnerable to financial constraints, but the negative consequences and
welfare losses as a result of financial constraints may be even more serious than those
encountered in other industries.
To motivate the empirical analysis, I construct a theoretical model to formalize
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the complex relationships among financial constraints, asymmetric information, and
nursing home quality. Based on the work by Klemperer (1995) and Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1996), the model has the flexibility to explain counter-cyclical quality
fluctuations. This model is also the first to provide a theoretical foundation for re-
search of financial conditions and quality of care. To empirically test the theoretical
predictions, I follow the approach used by Campello (2003), Khanna and Tice (2004),
and Zhu (2011). Regional and local business cycles are used to create the exogenous
cost shocks which nursing home managers do not fully expect when they make ex-
ante financial arrangements. Local business cycles are exogenous from the existing
financial leverage because it is impossible to perfectly forecast economic fluctuations.
Even if the managers can foretell the recessions and booms, the adjustments of cap-
ital structure are both expensive and time consuming; a significant adjustment of
capital structure often involves the redirection or restructuring of corporate strate-
gies. Local business cycles also directly affect internal cash flows through impacts on
labor markets. The majority of the nursing home workforce is comprised of nurse
aides (about 65% of the nurse hours1). They earn low hourly wages ($7.5; Yamada,
2002) and have a lower skill set compared to other types of nurses. When the econ-
omy is booming and unemployment rates are low, outside employment options for
the nurse aides become more attractive. While nursing home wages might be more
rigid because of fixed public reimbursement rates, during economic booms nurse aides
can earn significantly higher wages at alternative work sites, such as restaurants and
department stores (Cawley et al., 2006). In addition, with their salaries, educational
attainments, and demographics (Yamada, 2002), nurse aides are more likely to be the
secondary source of their household incomes. Therefore, they may withdraw from the
nursing homes workforce during economic booms when their spouses or other family
members have stable jobs and earn promising incomes. Of course, such labor mar-
1My calculation based on nursing homes in the sample
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ket impacts are not equal across all nursing homes. Financially constrained nursing
homes may have particular difficulty keeping up with wages and retaining their nurse
aides. Ex-ante financial leverage serves as the primary proxy for financial constraints.
With different levels of financial leverage, the differential responses to exogenous cost
shocks are interpreted as causal impacts of financial constraints on quality.
To assess nursing home financial constraints at the facility level, I collect au-
dited nursing home financial statements from several state health planning agencies.2
These audited financial statements provide detailed information on balance sheets,
cash flow, and employee turnover, which are essential to this study but not avail-
able from Medicare Cost Report and Online Survey, Certification and Reporting
(OSCAR) data. Using this large and unique dataset (comprising more than 3,500
nursing homes in six states from year 2000 to 2011), I investigate the causal relation-
ship between financial constraints and nursing home quality. I also provide evidence
about the dynamics between financial constraints and counter-cyclical quality. Qual-
ity measures include deficiencies, bed sores, physical restraint, nurse staffing, and
nurse turnover. County-level unemployment rates are the proxies to measure both
the cross-sectional and time-series variations of business cycles. 3 Results show that
financial constraints impair nursing home quality and that nursing home quality is
obviously counter-cyclical. Financial constraints also act as the accelerators that am-
plify the counter-cyclical quality. The estimated interaction term between ex-ante
financial leverage and business cycles measures suggest that compared to the quality
of less constrained nursing homes, the quality of more financially constrained nursing
homes decreases slightly further during economic booms and also improves slightly
more during recessions.
2e.g. OSHPD at California
3I also use Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level GDP growth rates to perform similar
analysis. The results are no major qualitative difference and will be available upon request
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2.1 Financial Constraints, Nursing Homes, and Counter-cyclical
Quality
2.1.1 Financial Constraints and Cyclical Accelerators
Financial constraints, whereby firms have limited access to external financial
resources, occur due to capital market imperfections that results from asymmetric
information, transaction costs, and agency problems related to debt finance (Fazzari
et al., 1988). Asymmetric information between creditors and borrowers leads to well-
known lemon problems (Akerlof , 1970) – even good quality borrowers can face credit
rationing. Tirole (2006) incorporates moral hazard and agency cost to explain that
high-debt firms will be more likely to be credit constrained because over-leverage may
distort the incentives of the entrepreneurs to misbehave at the cost of the lenders.
These imperfections cause external financing to fail to perfectly substitute for internal
cash flows, a result contrasting with Modigliani-Miller’s hypothesis of the irrelevance
of financial structure (Modigliani and Miller , 1958). Financially constrained firms
therefore are more sensitive to internal cash flows, consequently leading to various
impacts on operating and production decisions, be it regarding investments, pricing,
competition, and entry and exit. Yet, despite a long list of seminal work (Fazzari
et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales , 1997; Blanchard and Lopez-de Silane, 1994; La-
mont , 1997), the empirical evidence of financial constraints on product and service
quality is rather sparse. The lack of reliable measures of quality may be the primary
obstacle to demonstrate the dynamics between financial constraints and product qual-
ity. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) theorize that financial constraints can cause a
leveraged firm to lower product quality to increase internal cash-flows. Matsa (2011)
studies the frequency of inventory shortfalls in the supermarket industry and provides
one of the few empirical studies that supports the idea that financial constraints lead
to lower product quality. Matsa shows that the supermarkets undergoing leveraged
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buyouts (LBO) experienced more frequent inventory shortfalls, a measure of lower
product quality.
Financial constraints are also considered as the cyclical accelerator that magnifies
the initial small variations to large fluctuations. The fundamental insight is that,
in an ideal world without financial constraints, a firm that experiences temporary
demand or cost shocks should be able to substitute for internal cash shortfalls with
external financing. If there were no financial constraints, any transitory demand or
cost shocks should not affect firms’ investments and outputs, a producer’s analogy of
permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). Yet, the economic data from busi-
ness cycles suggest exactly the opposite: small shocks often evolve into disproportion-
ally large fluctuations. Bernanke and colleagues (1996) adopt the agency-principal
model between the borrowers and lenders to outline the problem of financial con-
straints. They provide empirical evidence that financial constraints can propagate an
initial shock to large swings of sales and inventories. Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Sharpe(1994), and
Lamont (1995) also provide theoretical and empirical support for the claim that bal-
ance sheet strength and financial conditions are important to cyclical behaviors. This
paper adopts the concept of financial accelerators to examine whether financial con-
straints amplify counter-quality fluctuations.
2.1.2 Nursing Homes and Counter-Cyclical Quality
Nursing homes fullfill an important role, providing care to the elderly who
have impaired functioning abilities. According to the most recent estimation, the U.S.
spends $139 billion on nursing home services annually and 3.3 million people live in
nursing facilities (CMS , 2010). Several unique characteristics (including incomplete
information, high switching costs, and regulated prices) make nursing homes a valu-
able site at which to investigate the impact of financial constraints on counter-cyclical
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quality. Two distinct forms of incomplete information reinforce each other and result
in inefficiencies in the credit and product markets. The first form of incomplete infor-
mation occurs in the lending market. Because the creditors can not perfectly observe
the borrowers’ expected profitability and the underlying business risks, this discour-
ages lenders from providing long-term capital at low interest rates or low required
rates of returns. Since learning business risks requires certain fixed costs, the average
cost of lending to a smaller firm is higher. Thus, smaller firms, or firms that do not
publicly disclose their information, are more likely to be financially constrained. This
form of incomplete information is significant in the nursing home industry. The an-
nual revenue for an average nursing home is only about $4 million. The majority of
nursing homes are not listed on the stock exchange; only a small fraction of nursing
homes issue corporate bonds (10% 4).
The second form of incomplete information takes place in the product market.
The asymmetric quality information between nursing homes and consumers distorts
the incentives for providing good quality care. Nursing home care can be viewed as
a type of experience good, the true quality of which is only revealed after purchase
and consumption. Because consumers can only respond to observed quality before
entering a specific nursing facility, nursing homes are not fully rewarded by providing
good quality and are not fully penalized by providing lower quality. Even if con-
sumers realize the true quality after choosing a nursing home, the high switching
costs of changing to another nursing facility further distorts the incentives to provide
good quality of care. Particularly, the explicit and implicit switching costs are higher
among the population who have difficulty accessing and processing the quality infor-
mation. Hirth and colleagues (2000) find that residents who are younger, healthier,
and have more generous coverage are more likely to transfer between nursing facili-
ties for better quality. The combination of asymmetric quality information and high
4From author’s calculation using California sample. There is a possibility that the bonds are
issued by the owner corporation and the bond information is not reflected in each nursing facility.
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switching costs lowers the quality elasticity of demand. This conjecture can be sup-
ported by recent studies on consumer response to nursing home quality reporting.
In 2002, Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began the Nursing Home
Quality Initiative (NHQI) to improve the transparency of nursing home quality. Yet,
recent studies have revealed that the quality program only achieves minor or no re-
sults, and consumers rarely respond to public quality reporting (Clement et al., 2011;
Werner et al., 2012; Hirth and Huang , 2012). The combination of asymmetric qual-
ity information and high switching costs exacerbates the negative impacts of financial
constraints on quality. When external financing is not feasible, financially constrained
nursing homes need to alter their production process to maintain a certain level of
cash flow. Depending on the quality elasticity of demand, a nursing home may im-
prove its quality to expand markets and boost revenues or lower its quality to save
operating costs. Based on the various nursing home literature mentioned above, it
is reasonable to assume that quality elasticity of demand is quite low. Thus, when
financial constraints are present, nursing homes will be more likely to lower quality
and cut operating costs in order to provide sufficient cash flows.
The relationship between financial constraints and quality can differ across busi-
ness cycles. Regulated prices and stable demand are two determinants of counter-
cyclical nursing home quality. Government insurance programs are the largest payers
for nursing home services. Medicare- and Medicaid-covered services combined ac-
count for the majority of nursing home markets5. The demand for skilled nursing
care is relatively inelastic because a large portion of expenditure is covered by the
government program and also because the utilization of skilled nursing services is usu-
ally not discretionary. Therefore, when faced with major cost shocks, nursing homes
can hardly pass the increasing operating costs to the consumers and must either im-
prove operating efficiency or reduce quality. From the nursing home perspective, the
5The calculation is based on the nursing homes included in this study.
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combination of incomplete information and high switching costs can make quality
reduction more appealing than efficiency improvement.
Counter-cyclical nursing home quality results from the pro-cyclical operating costs
and relatively inelastic demands. During economic recessions, unemployment rates
are high and outside wages and options for the nurse aides are low and limited.
Nursing homes can hire nurses with lower wages or pay the same wages to hire more
skilled nurses. Thus the operating costs are lower for the nursing homes to provide a
certain level of quality. Because the nursing home prices are highly regulated across
business cycles, nursing homes cannot cost shift higher operating costs into higher
prices. If nursing homes want to provide equivalent quality during boom periods, the
operating margins will decrease and internal cash flows from operating profits will also
dwindle. Incomplete quality information and high switching costs encourage nursing
homes to lower quality during economic booms. Recall how financial constraints
amplify cyclical behaviors. Nursing homes that have high existing financial leverage
and poor financial conditions will have more volatile quality fluctuations. Several
studies suggest counter-cyclical nursing home quality. Both Goodman (2006) and
Yamada (2002) have observed that employment in hospitals and nursing homes is
counter-cyclical. Stevens et al. (2011) find that, during recessions, nursing homes
have higher nurse staffing which explains the lower elderly mortality rates during the
recession. This paper extends previous research by examining comprehensive quality
measures and formalizing financial constraints as the main driver for counter-cyclical
quality.
Standardized quality measures are another empirical justification for using the
nursing home industry to investigate the relationship between financial constraints
and quality. Nursing home quality has long been the center of policy focus, mainly
because the quality is not fully observed by the consumers and most consumers be-
long to vulnerable populations who have a limited ability to process any partially
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observed quality. This paper uses quality measures published by NHQI. The quality
measures include health deficiencies, the use of physical restraint, the prevalence of
bed sores, nurse staffing, and other outcome measures.
2.2 The Model of Financial Constraints and Counter-Cyclical
Quality
In this section, I use a simple theoretical model to illustrate the relationships
among financial constraints, asymmetric quality information, and equilibrium quality.
The model also demonstrates counter-cyclical fluctuations of quality. To provide
a comparison benchmark, I start with a model in which the nursing homes solely
use internal cash flows to finance their operations. I then introduce a model with
differential access to external financial resources and compare the equilibria from
both models.
2.2.1 Asymmetric Quality Information and Consumer Demand
This basic model is built on the work of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) with
substantial modifications. First, in nursing home markets, standard price competi-
tion does not apply because the largest two payers, Medicare and Medicaid, account
for the majority of the skilled nursing days. For modeling convenience, I assume that
a nursing home receives fixed reimbursement price P . Second, consumers only have
incomplete quality information and they choose nursing homes based on observed
quality and transportation costs. When asymmetric quality information is severe,
consumers will have a more difficult time observing the true quality difference. I
assume the market demand for nursing home care is relatively stable and mostly de-
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pends on demographics and population factors6. The basic setup follows the linear
city model by Hotelling (1929). For simplicity, I assume two nursing homes, A and
B, that compete for two periods, t=1,2. Consumers are geographically distributed
uniformly at y ∈[0,1]. Since consumers choose nursing homes based on observed qual-
ity and transportation costs, the consumer’s demand of nursing home A and B for
consumer y in the first period can be defined as follows:
DAy,1 = 1 if βQ
A − Ty ≥ βQB − T (1− y)
DBy,1 = 1 if βQ
A − Ty < βQB − T (1− y)
(2.1)
Where DAy,1 is the demand of consumer y for nursing home A ; T can be interpreted
as the real transportation cost or an abstract concept of the switching cost; β is
between ∈ [0,1] and represents the severity of incomplete information. Because of
asymmetric medical knowledge and hidden information between providers and con-
sumers, it is often difficult for consumers to immediately observe the true quality
differences among the providers (Arrow , 1963). Consumers will only fully realize the
underlying quality in the second period and β will be equal to 1. The market share of
nursing home A in the first period, σA1 and in the second period σ
A




















6The provision of informal care during recessions may substitute away some deamds for nursing
home care. I acknowledge this limitation in this study.
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2.2.2 Nursing Home and Profit-Maximizing Quality
2.2.2.1 Internally Financed-Only Model
The benchmark model assumes that nursing homes use internal funds to fi-
nance the initial start-up costs and investments in facilities, so both nursing homes
A and B are 100% equity financed with zero liabilities. The firms receive fixed re-
imbursement rate P and choose profit-maximizing quality Q. Notice that operating
cost is a monotonically increasing function of quality; thus, C(Q)′ > 0. Quality is an
increasing function of labor (L) and capital (K) inputs. ∂Q(L,K)
∂L
> 0 and ∂Q(L,K)
∂K
> 0.
I further assume that nursing homes (not the consumers) have perfect and complete
information and the model is simplified as a two-period static game. θ is the real-
ization of operating costs across business cycles. θH and θL represent the costs to
produce one unit of quality during booms and recessions, respectively. θH is larger
than θL because operating costs are higher during economic booms than in recessions.
Because the economic outlook is uncertain, θ represents the expected cost to produce
unit quality. δ is the discounting operator to discount future profits to its net present
value, and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the major difference between the first and second period is
the severity of asymmetric quality information, δ can be interpreted as a representa-
tion how quickly the consumers learn the true quality. For instance, a nursing home
that focuses on short-stay consumers may have a larger δ because the higher resident
turnover facilitates quality information to be updated faster. Therefore, the magni-
tude of δ can be firm specific and depends on the resident turnover of and hence the
composition of nursing home residents. For a facility with more post-acute short-stay
patients, its δ can be larger than the facility whose residents are mostly chronically
ill and long-stay consumers. Nursing home As maximizing problem can be written
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as follows:









For convenience, assume for linear cost function that C = θQ. Taking partial deriva-



























Assuming that both nursing homes A and B are identical, symmetric Nash equilibrium








T ]. When the consumers observe less
quality (smaller β) and when the resident turnover is lower (smaller δ), both facilities
will provide lower quality. Furthermore, when the economic outlook is optimistic and
expected operating cost is higher (larger θ), the quality is lower.
Proof 1: See Appendix A.
2.2.2.2 Differential Access to External Financing
Building on the basic model, I introduce the concept of external financing
and financial constraints. Nursing homes have different capital structure decisions
and have different financial leverage (measured as debt over asset) ratios. Various
factors can result in different financial leverage ratios. For example, information
asymmetry between the lenders and the entrepreneurs can affect access to external
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financing resources; the CEO and CFO styles (Bertrand and Schoar , 2003 ; Cron-
qvist et al., 2009) may affect the trade-off between risk and returns and hence affect
the capital structure. The presence of financial constraints causes the highly levered
nursing home to have to rely on internal cash flows to repay the debt and crowd
out the financial resources available for operating activities. Therefore, holding all
factors equal, nursing homes with higher ex-ante financial leverage are more likely to
cut down operating expense and result in lower quality.
Hypothesis 2:
Compared to unconstrained nursing homes, financially constrained nursing homes will
provide lower quality.
2.2.2.3 The Interaction Effect of Business Cycles and Financial Con-
straints
To make the case interesting, for highly leveraged nursing homes, there is a
probability µ of being in recessions, during which the operating cost is low and the
highly leveraged nursing home can generate sufficient profits for debt service. By
contrast, there is a probability 1-µ of not being in a recession so that the nursing
home will not generate sufficient cash-flows to repay its debt and will have to close.
Thus, with the probability 1-µ, the nursing homes have to lower their quality to lower
their operating expense and generate cash flows for debt service. It should be noted
that nursing homes with higher existing debt may lower their quality more than the
less leveraged homes. This leads to the third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
Financial constraints can amplify the counter-cyclical quality fluctuations.
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Figure 2.1: Financially Constrained and Unconstrained NH Quality Over Time
2.2.2.4 For-profit Status and Counter-cyclical Quality
Nursing home care is an industry with mixed ownership in which both for-profit
and not-for-profit organizations have significant presence. Among the nursing homes
in the analytic sample, 77%, are for-profit. It is well documented theoretically and
empirically that not-for-profit nursing homes provide higher quality than for-profit
nursing homes (Hirth, 1999 ; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003). Building on the litera-
ture, I extend the understanding of ownership differences by investigating whether
for-profit nursing homes have different cyclical-quality fluctuation compared to not-
for-profit nursing homes. Because not-for-profit enterprises cannot distribute residual
profits to their shareholders, Hansmann (1980) theorizes that not-for-profit health
organizations mitigate the agency contracting failure and ensure quality. Building
on Hansmann’s explanation, the interaction between financial constraints and busi-
ness cycles will have stronger impacts on the quality of for-profit nursing homes than
not-for-profit ones. For instance, during booms, when operating costs are high, the
financially constrained nursing homes have stronger incentives for lowering quality to
maintain the profits that will be distributed to the shareholders.
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Hypothesis 4:
Counter-cyclical quality fluctuation is more pronounced among for-profit nursing homes
2.2.2.5 System Affiliation
The U.S. nursing home industry provides an exciting opportunity to examine
the effects of chain affiliation on financial constraints and on cyclical quality behav-
iors. About 50% of the nursing homes in the sample belong to multi-facility chains.
At the individual facility level, system affiliations can have two opposite effects on
financial constraints. First, the internal capital markets hypothesis suggests that
nursing homes that belong to multi-facility chains will be less likely to be financially
constrained. The internal capital markets within the nursing home system enables
individual facilities to borrow at lower rates from the headquarters (Lamont , 1997).
Furthermore, as shown by Hoshi et al. (1991), firms that belong to large indus-
trial groups are less likely to be financially constrained in comparison to independent
firms. Similarly, nursing home chains can also exercise their bargaining power to
raise external capital collectively for individual nursing facilities. These two hypothe-
ses suggest that system-affiliated nursing homes are less financially constrained and
that their quality is less cyclical. Alternatively, anecdotal evidence from nursing home
managers suggests that chain-affiliated homes may need to distribute certain levels
of profits to their headquarters. This relocation of cash flows away from individual
facilities leads to an opposite prediction that chain-affiliated nursing homes can be
more financially constrained and have more volatile quality fluctuation.
Hypothesis 5:
System affiliation can either amplify or alleviate quality fluctuation
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2.2.2.6 Private-pay revenue share
In Section 3.1, the theoretical predictions suggest that nursing homes will pro-
vide lower quality when consumers have lower quality elasticity of demand. Sub-
sequently, the quality of such nursing homes will be more counter-cyclical. When
operating costs rise during economic booms, nursing homes with low quality elastic-
ity of demand can lower quality without losing too much market share, at least in
the short term. While the theoretical implications are clear, empirical assessment is
challenging because quality elasticity is not perfectly measurable. Therefore, I use
private-pay revenue shares as proxies for quality elasticity of demand at the nursing
home level. Most nursing homes’ revenues are composed of three payer types: Med-
icaid, Medicare, and private pay. Compared to public markets, private-pay markets
can be more quality elastic. Private-pay residents may have superior abilities to pro-
cess quality information, and they may be more likely to be able to afford switching
costs of transfers.
Hypothesis 6:
Nursing homes focusing on private-pay residents have milder quality fluctuation
2.3 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy
I obtained audited nursing home financial information from six state health
planning agencies from 2000 to 2011. Using the Medicare provider number, I then
merged the financial information with CMS’s NHQI files which contain a rich set of
nursing home quality measures. I also include local employment information from
Area Resource Files (ARF) and other databases collected by the Bureau of Labor
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Statistics.
2.3.1 Nursing Home Financial Data:
The lack of reliable financial information is a major challenge to empirical
examination of the impacts of financial constraints on nursing home quality. Most
nursing homes are relatively small and most are not publicly listed on a stock ex-
change market. Hence, most are not required to provide annual financial reports to
the public. Medicare Cost Reports and OSCAR, two popular data sets providing
detailed nursing facilities information, only contain profitability measures and do not
include balance sheets and cash flow information. To overcome this issue, I obtained
audited nursing home financial reports from state health planning agencies of Ari-
zona, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio from 2000 to 2011 (See
Table 2.1). Nursing homes in these states are required to disclose their audited an-
nual financial statements and submit them to state health planning agencies. This
unique compiled data set comprises about 3,500 nursing facilities, which is about 20%
of all of the nursing facilities in the U.S. The analytic sample is about 28,000 nursing
home-year observations. I exclude these nursing facilities in the analysis, because
the interpretation of their financial information and patient mixes are different from
nursing facilities that are not within hospitals. Although each state has a different
format of the nursing home financial report, the basic and fundamental categories
and variables in the balance sheet are consistent across states.
2.3.1.1 Measures of Financial Constraints
I use the financial leverage ratio as the primary proxy for financial con-
straints because, with high existing leverage, the nursing homes will be less likely to
raise additional capital. The financial leverage ratio is defined as total debt-over-total
asset, a broad definition of financial leverage. The leverage ratio measures financial
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constraints in two ways. First, the financial constraints of a nursing home with high
existing leverage is more likely binding. A highly leveraged nursing home has more
difficulty borrowing new funds (Tirole, 2006). Second, a highly leveraged nursing
home may use a higher portion of its cash flows for interest expenses and debt ser-
vices. When facing unexpected shocks, a nursing home with higher ex-ante leverage
has less financial resources to respond to the shocks. Instead of using market val-
ues, I use book values to calculate the leverage, because most nursing homes are not
publicly listed on stock exchanges, and their market values are simply not available.
Compared to more short-term financial measures, total liability over total asset ratio
is less sensitive to the fluctuations of profits and less sensitive to the time-variant
unobservable.7 Since there has been a long debate in the literature regarding the
correct measures for financial constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales ,
1997; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), I also used working capital (defined as the differ-
ence between current asset and current liability) and Current Ratio (current asset
over current liability) to check the robustness of the results 8.
2.3.1.2 Measures of Nursing Home Quality
Quality measures are extracted from the CMS’ Nursing Home Compare web-
site. The website describes comprehensive quality measures for all Medicare certified
nursing homes. The quality measures include nurse staffing ratios, deficiencies iden-
tified by regulators, the prevalence of physical restraint, the prevalence of pressure
sores, and other health measures. These quality measures are widely used in stud-
ies of nursing home quality. Inspection deficiency measures become available in 2001,
and other quality measures become available from 2003 to 2010. Every 12-15 months,
state health personnel inspect all nursing homes and report any deficiencies and their
7The correlation between financial leverage ratio and 1 year lag financial leverage ratio is 0.84.
This suggests that when facing unexpected macro shocks, the nursing home managers are not able
to adjust the financial leverage ratio in a short period of time.
8The results of working capital are not reported in the paper for brevity.
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severities. I use two deficiency measures. The first measure, Deficiency Count, is
the number of deficiencies a nursing home has. I count the number of deficiencies
for each nursing home in the most recent survey. Second, I weigh each deficiency by
its severity and create a Deficiency Score variable that aggregates all of the severity-
weighted deficiencies. The higher the deficiency score, the lower the quality. Other
quality measures are reported quarterly, and I use the fourth-quarter figures to proxy
the latest quality in each year. High prevalence of restraint use and pressure sores in
general represent low quality. In addition to measures of physical quality, I include
measures of the mental health of nursing home residents. Each nursing home is as-
sessed according to the percentage of its residents who are more depressed or anxious.
A detailed description of quality measures appears in Appendix B. I use the Medicare
provider number to merge nursing home financial information and the corresponding
quality measures.
Detailed nurse staffing hours and employee turnover provide important informa-
tion to validate the mechanism that causes nursing home quality fluctuation. Nurse
staffing measures include Registered Nurses (RN) hours per patient day, Certificated
Nurse Aides (CNA) hours per patient day, and total nurse hours per patient day.
CNAs compose the most important workforce in the nursing home industry, account-
ing for 65% of nurse hours. Employee turnover is another mechanism by which busi-
ness cycles can affect the quality of care. Turnover is calculated by dividing the
total number of employees during a year by the number of employees by the end of
year. High turnover suggests that, on average, the employees have shorter tenure
for the same nursing facilities. This can lead to less training and unfamiliarity with
specific needs of individual residents. Turnover information is not available from the
CMS’ NHC website and is only available through nursing home financial reports from
Arizona, California, New York, and Ohio 9.
9Ohio nursing homes provide retention rates instead of turnover rates. I create the proxy for
turnover by subtracting retention rates from 1. This proxy underestimates the real turnover.
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2.3.1.3 Additional Control Variables
The NHC dataset also provides several important nursing home-level and
market-level control variables. Nursing home ownership types, sizes, payer-mixes,
and system affiliation are the key variables to control for the nursing home hetero-
geneity. In the sample, 70% are for-profit and about 19% of them are not-for-profit.
The median nursing home has 113.2 beds and 47% of the nursing homes are affili-
ated with multi-facility systems. Market-level covariates include median household
income and population above 65 years old per square mile. The county is used as
the primary definition of nursing home market. To control for the intensity of market
competition, I construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) by summarizing the
squares of nursing home market shares in each county. 10
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The basic specification uses pooled sample ordinary least squares and control
for the state-fixed effects, the linear time trend, and the state-specific time trend.
Qi,t = FLi,t−1β +NHi,tλ+Mm,tΘ + S + T + SXT + ε (2.5)
where Qi,t is quality for nursing home i and at year t. FLi,t−1 is one year lagged
log financial leverage used as the proxy for financial constraints for nursing home
i at year t. Because the distribution of financial ratios is known to be positively
skewed, I take log transformation on the financial variables. NH is a vector of
nursing home characteristics that include ownership types (e.g., for-profit and not-
for-profit), size (number of beds), system affiliation, occupancy rate, and public and
private payer mixes. M is nursing home market level characteristics11, such as the
HHI concentration level and demographic variables (median household income) for
10Market share is calculated by the number of nursing home beds in each county
11nursing home market level characteristics are calculated at the county level.
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market m and at year t. S is the state indicator variable that controls for state-fixed
effects. T represents linear trends to capture unobservable changes over time. SXT
represents the state-specific time trend. 12
2.3.3 Regional Recession and Local Unemployment Rates:
Measures of local business cycles serve two important purposes. The de-
cision of quality directly affects the financial constraints. Therefore, to deal with
this endogeneity issue, I use a set of instruments to identify business cycles at the
local or regional levels. These business cycle measures provide both cross-sectional
and time-series variations. I obtain unemployment rates at the county level from the
ARF and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Similarly, I use the regional economic
accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to obtain GDP growth rates for each
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). In addition, county-level variables such as me-
dian income, population age above 65 years old per square mile, and unemployment
rates are obtained from the ARF13. Because the financial constraints and choice of
nursing home quality could be endogenous to each other, exogenous shock that only
affects one but not the other is desired to establish clear causal relationship. Unex-
pected changes of the market environments include other instruments often used in
the literature. Business cycle is a particularly popular one. Chevalier and Scharfstein
(1996), Campello (2003), and Khanna and Tice (2004) all used the business cycle as
an exogenous demand shock to study the effects of financial leverage on operating
decisions. Zhu (2011) used commodity prices as exogenous cost shocks to examine
the impacts of financial constraints on product market competition. These papers
adopt the assumption that the fluctuation of the economy is not perfectly foreseen
12I also run a year-fixed-effect model as a robustness check. The results are consistent with the
results from the linear time trend specification. The time trend model is preferred, because it enables
the use of variations both across counties and across years.
13The unemployment rates of 1999, 2010, and 2011 are directly downloaded from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics
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by the managers when financial leverage decisions were made and the adjustments
of financial leverage are not always feasible. I use business cycles as a surrogate for
exogenous cost shock to the nursing home industry. The empirical specification with
exogenous cost shock can be defined as follows:
Qi,t = FLi,t−2β+BCm,t−1γ+FLi,t−2XBCm,t−1τ+NHi,tλ+Mm,tΘ+S+T +SXT +ε
(2.6)
Notice that in this specification, BC represents the regional and local market con-
dition for market m and at time t. I use the MSA-level GDP growth rates and the
county-level unemployment rates to provide continuous measurements capturing both
time-series and geographical variations of business cycles. The key variables of inter-
est are lagged financial leverage, the interaction terms of lagged financial leverage, and
business cycle measures. Compared to the literature on cyclical behaviors, business
cycle has a distinct impact on the nursing home industry. Because wages account for
about two-thirds of the nursing home operating cost, operating cost is low during a
recession when unemployment rate is high. Holding all else equal, the operating cash
flows will be higher during recessions than in booms. Therefore, nursing homes with
high existing financial leverage will face the most severe liquidity constraint when
the economy grows rapidly. Stevens et al. (2011) find that, during the recession,
nursing homes have higher nurse staffing and lower mortality. In addition, Cawley
and colleagues (2006) find that local wage levels inversely affect nursing home quality.
Therefore, to incorporate differential local responses to the business cycle, real GDP
growth rates for each MSA are used to measure the regional business cycle.
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2.3.4 Structure of Time Lag:
When unemployment rates are high, nursing homes may hire more nurses
and have lower employee turnover. This change of nursing home workforce leads
to better nursing home quality. However, the time lag between the change of local
market condition and the reflection in quality improvement is unknown. I specify
preferred time lags for quality measures based on when these measures were inspected
and reported. First, nursing homes are inspected, and any deficiencies (both health
and fire safety) are reported at least once for every 12-15 months. For example,
2008 deficiencies data may be reported anytime from September 2007 to December
2008. This creates large variations of when the nursing homes are actually inspected.
Second, nursing homes report quarterly on the prevalence of physical restraint, the
prevalence of pressure sores, and the mental health conditions of residents. Third,
nurse staffing hours and employee turnover are reported by each calendar quarter
or at the end of the year. To allow sufficient time for the changes in labor market
to be reflected in nursing home quality, I examine the impacts of one-year lagged
unemployment rates on all quality measures.
Such lag structures between quality measures and unemployment rates, accord-
ingly, affect the lag structure of financial leverage ratios. To account for the reverse
causality and simultaneity issues between financial arrangements and local unemploy-
ment, financial leverage ratios will indicate a one-year lag of unemployment rates in
every empirical specification.
2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion:
In this section, I first present the empirical results to show the effects of finan-
cial constraints and unemployment rates on nurse staffing and turnover. It provides
clear evidence that local business cycles directly affect nursing home quality through
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the change in labor markets. Second, I run the same regressions on health deficiencies,
the prevalence of physical restraint, and the prevalence of pressure sores, which are
considered to be more sensitive to labor inputs. The results of labor inputs and these
quality measures are consistent with the theoretical predictions. For a robustness
test, I also run the same empirical specifications on the quality measures that are
either more capital intensive or requiring more complex management. Local unem-
ployment should only affect this set of quality measures if recessions ease the financial
constraints. I close with the analysis of differential effects by ownership, system af-
filiation, and private-pay revenue share. The differential cyclical patterns between
for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes are striking and particularly interesting.
2.4.1 The Counter-Cyclical Nurse Staffing and Turnover
The theoretical prediction that nursing home quality is counter-cyclical relies
on the assertion that, during a recession, worse labor markets limit the availability
of alternative jobs and make the alternatives less monetarily appealing, particularly
when some of the alternatives are pro-cyclical. Therefore, during economic down-
times, nursing homes can increase their nurse staff numbers, hire more experienced
and skillful nurses, and face less nurse turnover. Such improvements in the nursing
home workforce should lead to better nursing home quality. To verify that nursing
home labor inputs are an important mechanism that explains counter-cyclical quality,
I directly examine the impacts of unemployment rates on nurse staffing hours and
turnover. Because nurse turnover data are not available for all states, only nursing
homes in Arizona, California, New York, and Ohio are included in the turnover analy-
sis. Nurse staffing hours are extracted from NHC website and, to account for different
mixes of nurse specialties, I run separate regressions on certificated nurse aide (CNA)
hours per patient, registered nurse (RN) hours per patient, and total nurse hours per
patient. The results are shown in Table 2.3. From column (1) to column (4), results
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from all specifications provide statistically significant evidence (p<0.01) that nurse
staffing hours and turnover are counter-cyclical: higher nurse staffing hours and lower
turnover exist during recessions. Comparing the effects of change of unemployment
rates on labor inputs, I find that the magnitudes are larger for employee turnover
than for nurse staffing hours. For a nursing home with an average financial leverage,
a 5 percentage point increase in unemployment rates can lower turnover by 4.35%.
This is about 11.4% of the mean and 13.56% of the standard deviation. The same
changes only increase CNA hours by 0.07 hours and total nurse hours by 0.145 hours.
On the other hand, the effects of financial constraints are less robust. While the
estimated coefficients of lagged financial leverage are negative for all nurse staffing
measures, it is only statistically significant on CNA hours at the 5% level. However,
the coefficient of lagged financial leverage on turnover is statistically significant at
the 1% level. The coefficients of the interaction term between lagged financial lever-
age and unemployment rates are mostly statistically insignificant and magnitudes are
relatively small. Overall, the analysis of nurse staffing and turnover provides con-
sistent and strong evidence that both nurse hours and turnover are counter-cyclical.
This supports the hypothesis that the pro-cyclical labor markets may explain the
counter-cyclical nursing home quality.
2.4.2 Financial Constraints and Counter-Cyclical Quality
Empirical results in Table 2.4 present consistent evidence that financial con-
straints lead to lower nursing home quality and that nursing home quality is counter-
cyclical. My interpretation focuses on the estimated marginal effects of lag financial
leverage, change in unemployment rates, and the interaction term between lag finan-
cial leverage and change in unemployment rates. The coefficients of lagged financial
leverage and change in unemployment rates are statistically significant at the 1%
level for all quality measures. The signs of the estimates are consistent with the the-
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oretical predictions: more financially constrained nursing homes have lower quality,
and higher unemployment rates lead to better nursing home quality. The magnitudes
are substantial. One standard deviation of higher financial leverage increases health
deficiency scores by 1.9 and the number of deficiencies by 0.44, leading to higher
prevalence of physical restraint by 0.35 percentage points and of pressure sores by
0.30 percentage points. On the other hand, when unemployment rate increases by
5 percentage points, the health deficiencies score decreases by 2.4, and number of
the deficiencies decreases by 0.585. A 5 percentage point increase in unemployment
rates also reduces the prevalence of physical restraint by 1.19 percentage points and
the prevalence of pressure sores by 0.69 percentage points. The coefficients of the
leverage and unemployment interaction term provide empirical evidence that finan-
cial constraints amplify counter-cyclical quality fluctuations. I find weak evidence
that supports this hypothesis. The coefficients of the interaction term are negative
across all regressions, but are not statistically significant for the deficiency score and
counts. In addition, the magnitudes of the marginal effects are small even when they
are statistically significant.
While the results of labor inputs and labor sensitive quality measures provide
strong evidence that quality is counter-cyclical, the results also suggest a discrepancy
that financial constraints may have significant impacts on quality measures but not
on labor inputs. The concept of diminishing marginal productivity of labor may help
to explain this discrepancy. Descriptive statistics suggest that highly leveraged nurs-
ing homes on average have lower staffing hours, higher turnover, and lower quality.
Applying the law of diminishing marginal productivity of labor to quality, despite
the same improvements of nurse staffing hours and turnover, the marginal quality
improvement of financially constrained nursing homes will be larger than the uncon-
strained ones. However, this hypothesis cannot be empirically tested without knowing
the nursing home production function. This would require structural estimation of
29
the functional form of the production process and is beyond the scope of this study.
2.4.3 Alternative Hypothesis of Leverage
There is a concern that nursing homes with high existing leverage might have
better access to debt finance. The highly leveraged nursing homes could be actually
less financially constrained. If this assertion is true, when labor costs increase during
economic booms, highly leveraged nursing homes should have better access to ex-
ternal capital markets than those with low existing leverage. Therefore, one should
expect that quality of highly leveraged nursing homes to be less counter-cyclical. The
results clearly reject this hypothesis.
2.4.4 Alternative Quality Measures: Fire Safety and Compliance of Vac-
cination
An alternative to drawing the causality between financial constraints and
quality is to examine the effects of unemployment rates on a different set of quality
measures that are not directly affected by the change of nursing home workforce. This
set of quality measures includes deficiencies that undermine fire safety and compliance
with vaccination recommendations. These two measures may be considered more
capital-intensive or more complex to practice than previous labor sensitive measures.
For instance, fire safety deficiencies involve investments to upgrade and renovate the
infrastructure, and vaccination compliance may require longer reimbursement cycles
and more complex coordination. Therefore, higher unemployment may improve these
quality measures because lower labor costs ease the financial constraints and thus lead
to higher/better investments in fire safety and vaccinations. The results in Table 2.5
provide statistically significant (P<0.01) and consistent evidence that recessions ease
financial constraints and lead to better investment in quality improvement.
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2.4.5 Differences between for-profit and not-for-profit ownerships
Results in Table 2.6 provide evidence supporting this hypothesis. I split the
sample into Panel A (for-profit) and Panel B (not-for-profit) and repeat the same
analysis on two subsamples separately. Notably, financial constraints and unemploy-
ment have larger and more statistically significant (P<0.01) effects on the quality
of for-profit homes. Surprisingly, in Panel B, the effects of unemployment rates on
not-for-profit homes are insignificant and even positive. For this comparison, financial
constraints have stronger impacts on the quality of for-profit nursing homes than of
not-for-profit ones. More interestingly, only for-profit nursing homes have counter-
cyclical quality. These results provide a new perspective of the differences between
for-profit and not-for-profit ownerships and also provide additional explanations re-
garding why not-for-profit organizations are essential and prevalent in health care
markets.
2.4.6 Competing Hypotheses on System Affiliation
I present the results in Table 2.7. Across most regressions, financial con-
straints and business cycles have stronger and more statistically significant effects on
system-affiliated facilities than on independent facilities. The estimated interaction
effects are only statistically significant for the use of physical restraint and the preva-
lence of pressure sores (P<0.05). Overall, the regression results from the split sample
reject the internal capital market hypothesis and favor the alternative that system
affiliation causes individual nursing homes to be more financially constrained.
However, there is a major limitation that the system-level leverage measurement
is not available. It is possible that nursing home chains use higher leverage, and thus
affiliated homes are more sensitive to the change of operating cash flows over the
business cycles. If this is true, the internal capital hypothesis can also explain the
results that system-affiliated nursing homes are more financially constrained.
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2.4.7 The Role of Private-Pay Revenue Shares
I split the sample into Panel A, which includes nursing homes with private-
pay revenue share below the median (12.97%), and Panel B, which includes that
above the median14. The results are presented in Table 2.8. The coefficients of
the interaction term between financial leverage and unemployment rates are only
statistically significant for Panel A but not for Panel B. In addition, the magnitudes
of the interaction effects in Panel A are more than twice those in Panel B. This
provides supportive evidence that nursing home quality is more cyclical for those
facilities that have less private-pay residents. Also, financial constraints only amplify
the counter-cyclical quality fluctuation for the nursing homes with fewer private-pay
residents. However, I acknowledge that I cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis
that nursing homes can increase private prices when operating costs are high and
hence can maintain more stable quality across business cycles.
2.4.8 Pro-cyclical Mental Health
Interestingly, I find that mental health demonstrates cyclical patterns op-
posite those of physical health. I use the percentage of residents becoming more
depressed or anxious as a proxy for mental health. As shown in Table 2.9, the empiri-
cal results are consistent with Ruhm (2000) that mental health is strongly pro-cyclical
(P<0.01); residents are more depressed during recessions than during booms. This
result is particularly interesting, because nursing home residents, by definition, are
institutionalized and most of them live on public insurance programs. During reces-
sions, not only do they receive better care, but they are also almost isolated from the
negative impacts of unemployment. Several potential explanations for this are avail-
able. For example, social contagion (Eisenberg et al., 2012) from the more depressed
14I also attempt to run a triple-interaction model among financial leverage, unemployment rates,
and private-pay revenue share. However, I do not have sufficient statistical power to do so.
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nursing home workers or concerns for their beloved adult children might provide direc-
tions for future research. Further empirical analysis will require detailed information
of mental health status at the individual level and is beyond the scope of this study.
2.5 Concluding Remark
I provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that nursing
home quality is counter cyclical and that financial constraints lead to lower quality.
Somewhat weaker evidence also suggests that financial constraints amplify counter-
cyclical quality fluctuations. Interestingly, these findings are particularly prominent
among for-profit nursing homes, which also largely focus on Medicaid residents and
are more likely to belong to multi-facility chains. This sharp contrast of cyclical
quality fluctuations between for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes provides new
evidence for the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit ownerships.
In contrast to public perception, nursing home quality significantly improves dur-
ing economic downturns and worsens during economic booms. The fundamentals lie
in the interplay among regulated prices, relatively stable market demands, and labor
market fluctuations. During economic recessions, nurse staffing hours increase and
employee turnover decrease. I propose that such changes in the workforce lead to
the observed quality fluctuations. The deficiencies, physical restraint, pressure sores,
and compliance with vaccination demonstrate significant improvements during eco-
nomic downturns. Such strong counter-cyclical quality suggests that managers and
policy makers should be more concerned about nursing home quality when and where
the economy is rapidly growing. While this paper focuses on the quality of nursing
homes, the theoretical predictions and empirical findings may be generalized and ap-
plied to hospitals, education, public services, and other industries that share common
attributes.
Financial constraints reduce nursing homes investments in quality across many
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dimensions. The results are robust and consistent when using financial leverage, the
cash flow sensitivities, and the current ratio as the proxies for financial constraints.
Strong implications can be derived from the results. First, our economy is head-
ing toward recovery from the Great Recession and the financial burdens to hire and
maintain skillful workforce will become even greater. Second, more than 10% of
unique nursing homes have becomed involved in highly leveraged transactions by pri-
vate equity firms in the past decade (Stevensons and Grabowski , 2008; GAO , 2010);
these highly leveraged nursing facilities more likely exhausted their external finan-
cial resources. Because the adjustments of capital structure are not always feasible,
aggressive financial arrangements can lead to suboptimal quality when facing eco-
nomic and regulatory uncertainties. A special program might be desirable to provide
alternative credit channels for efficient but financially constrained nursing homes.
Although nursing home quality has improved significantly in the past decade,
continuous quality improvement is of concern because of the interplay among eco-
nomic recovery, highly leveraged transactions, and government fiscal difficulty. The
beginning of economic recovery is also the beginning of the challenge.
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Figure 2.2: Avg. county unemployment rates by state over sample periods
Figure 2.3: Nurse Aide Hrs per Patient Day and 1 yr lag ∆ Unemployment Rate
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Figure 2.4: Employee Turnover and 1 yr lag ∆ Unemployment Rate
Figure 2.5: Number of Health Deficiency and 1 yr lag ∆ Unemployment Rate
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Figure 2.6: Prevalence of Physical Restraint and 1 yr lag ∆ Unemployment Rate
Figure 2.7: Prevalence of Pressure Sores and 1 yr lag ∆ Unemployment Rate
37
Table 2.1: Sample Composition by State and by Year
State Years Countys MSAs Facility-Years CON Moratorium
Arizona 2007-2010 15 6 435 NO
California 2000-2010 57 26 10,017 NO
Illinois 2005-2011 102 11 4,535 NO
Massachusetts 2001-2010 14 6 2,671 YES
Ohio 2001-2010 88 16 8,668 YES/NO
New York 2005-2010 62 12 3,269 NO
Total 338 77 28,944
Note 1: I used lagged financial measures so the observations in the first year of each state will not
be included in the analysis.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Min Max N
Labor Inputs:
Registered Nurse (hrs/Patient Day) 0.61 0.38 0 12.62 23893
Certified Nurse Aides (hrs/Patient Day) 2.37 0.60 0 17.29 23893
Total Nurse (hrs/per Patient Day) 3.75 0.87 0.04 22.86 23893
Employee Turnover 39.78 33.45 -1 1133.33 16524
Labor-sensitive Quality Measures
Health Deficiencies
Severity-Weighted Score 29.22 26.91 0 280 28141
Count 7.12 6.27 0 52 28141
Percent of Physical Restraint 7.08 8.41 0 100 24313
Percent of Pressure Sores 12.99 7.21 0 95 19713
Percent of Moderate/Severe Pain 4.92 5.20 0 70 24144
Broader Quality Measures
Fire and Life Safety Deficiencies
Severity-Weighted Score 15.00 16.22 0 126 26597
Count 3.40 3.43 0 25 26597
Pneumococcal Vaccination Compliance
Percent of Long-Stay Patients 81.75 21.80 0 95 23269
Percent of Short-Stay Patients 77.69 23.66 0 95 21062
Mental Health
Percent of More Depressed or Anxious 14.23 9.08 0 76 24178
Independent variables




∆Unemployment Rates 0.62 1.44 -8 9 28141
GDP Growth Rates 0.98 2.86 -10 13 22199
For-Profit 0.77 0.42 0 1 28141
Govt Owned 0.02 0.15 0 1 28141
System Affiliation 0.50 0.50 0 1 28141
Occupancy Rate 86.65 12.49 1 100 28141
ResidentOnly 0.60 0.49 0 1 28141
# of Beds 116.97 70.36 6 889 28141
Private-pay share 0.17 0.17 -1.92 2.32 28141
MedicaidOnly 0.02 0.13 0 1 28141
MedicareOnly 0.02 0.13 0 1 28141
ln (Household Income) 10.82 0.22 10.21 11.46 28141
HHI Index 0.09 0.13 0.00 1 28141
per SqueMile 65 0.29 0.76 0.00 9.16 28141
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Table 2.3: Counter-cyclical Labor Inputs
Nurse Hours per Patient Day
CNA hrs RN hrs Tot Nurse hrs Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Levg)t−2 -0.024** -0.003 -0.006 1.651***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.009] [0.335]
∆UnempRt−1 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.029*** -0.907***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.197]
Ln(Levg)t−2 0.002 0 0.001 -0.004
X∆UnempRt−1 [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.111]
For-profit -0.260*** -0.082*** -0.375*** 5.888***
[0.022] [0.011] [0.029] [0.765]
Govt Owned -0.01 -0.021 -0.044 0.059
[0.048] [0.026] [0.061] [1.619]
System-affiliated -0.136*** 0.012 -0.151*** -1.718**
[0.013] [0.008] [0.019] [0.695]
Occupancy Rate -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.104***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.032]
Resident Only 0.001 -0.001 0.012 -0.351
[0.012] [0.007] [0.017] [0.632]
Number of Beds -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.023***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Private pay share 0.147* 0.071** 0.200* -11.093***
[0.085] [0.028] [0.107] [2.071]
Medicaid Only -0.036 -0.086*** -0.103 2.941
[0.067] [0.030] [0.114] [5.013]
Medicare Only 0.220*** 0.323*** 0.673*** -2.012
[0.077] [0.064] [0.123] [2.259]
Ln(Income) -0.008 0.242*** 0.126*** -5.964***
[0.034] [0.020] [0.049] [1.682]
HHI Index 0.086 -0.068** -0.102 -1.891
[0.055] [0.030] [0.071] [2.788]
Pou. above 65 0.001 0.021*** -0.041** -1.335***
per mile2(,000) [0.011] [0.006] [0.015] [0.434]
Constant 2.781*** -1.560*** 3.324*** 71.250***
[0.369] [0.216] [0.525] [18.480]
State Fixed Effect
√ √ √ √
State Time Trend
√ √ √ √
R2 0.141 0.141 0.153 0.360
N 20647 20647 20647 14878
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the facility level to account for within facility het-
erogeneity. Note (3) Turnover regression only includes facilities in Arizona, California, and Ohio
States.
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Table 2.4: Labor-sensitive Quality Measures - ∆ Unemployment Rates
Health Deficiency Health Outcome
Score Count Restraint Pressure Sores Pain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Levg)t−2 2.240*** 0.494*** 0.413*** 0.371*** 0.205***
[0.285] [0.064] [0.120] [0.092] [0.066]
∆UnemRt−1 -0.480*** -0.117*** -0.238*** -0.138*** -0.100***
[0.149] [0.033] [0.040] [0.043] [0.028]
Ln(Levg)t−2 -0.065 -0.016 -0.067* -0.096*** -0.040**
X∆UnemRt−1 [0.117] [0.027] [0.035] [0.035] [0.020]
For-profit 3.424*** 0.884*** 1.067*** 1.600*** 0.359**
[0.756] [0.176] [0.245] [0.251] [0.174]
Govt Owned -1.545 -0.354 0.726 0.462 0.435
[1.380] [0.309] [0.570] [0.578] [0.321]
System-affiliated 0.197 0.028 -0.689*** -0.362* -0.027
[1.457] [0.330] [0.615] [0.626] [0.346]
Occupancy Rate -0.122*** -0.027*** -0.020** -0.042*** -0.034***
[0.022] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006]
Resident Only 0.619 0.166 -0.529*** -0.122 0.280***
[0.460] [0.105] [0.192] [0.166] [0.106]
Number of Beds 0.064*** 0.015*** 0.002 0.005*** -0.001
[0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Private pay share -6.035* -1.447* 0.464 -1.436 -0.86
[3.521] [0.848] [0.303] [1.179] [0.713]
Medicaid Only -2.503 -0.94 -0.361 -1.869 -0.499
[2.785] [0.577] [1.767] [1.989] [0.879]
Medicare Only -7.326*** -1.892*** -0.9 -1.294 -0.037
[2.004] [0.493] [1.707] [2.208] [0.647]
Ln(Income) 3.767*** 0.825*** -0.981* -0.669 -0.178
[1.401] [0.320] [0.563] [0.497] [0.319]
HHI Index 7.262*** 1.298*** -0.277 -5.897*** 1.395**
[2.160] [0.479] [0.842] [0.837] [0.637]
Pou. > 65 -2.579*** -0.591*** -0.728*** 0.684*** -0.130**
per mile2(,000) [0.342] [0.076] [0.125] [0.161] [0.061]
Constant -12.842 -2.763 15.368** 23.346*** 8.568**
[15.239] [3.463] [6.130] [5.404] [3.457]
State Fixed Effect
√ √ √ √ √
State Time Trend
√ √ √ √ √
R2 0.171 0.224 0.268 0.077 0.137
22934 22934 21285 17363 21149
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the facility level to account for within facility hetero-
geneity.
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Table 2.5: Broader Quality Measures - ∆ Unemployment Rates
Fire Safety Deficiency Pneumococcal Vaccination
Score Count Long Stay Short Stay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Levg)t−2 0.605*** 0.142*** -0.611** -0.658*
[0.147] [0.033] [0.305] [0.355]
∆UnempRt−1 -0.137 -0.088*** 1.906*** 2.772***
[0.096] [0.021] [0.163] [0.196]
Ln(Leveg)t−2 -0.002 0.005 0.319*** 0.193**
X∆UnempRt−1 [0.072] [0.016] [0.090] [0.108]
For-profit 0.22 0.052 -4.376*** -4.500***
[0.384] [0.081] [0.566] [0.726]
Govt Owned 1.124 0.214 1.515 2.966*
[0.947] [0.190] [1.308] [1.790]
System-affiliated 0.213 0.071 -2.483*** -3.528***
[0.294] [0.064] [0.557] [0.658]
Occupancy Rate -0.052*** -0.011*** 0.062** 0.026
[0.014] [0.003] [0.024] [0.029]
Resident Only 1.075*** 0.246*** 0.81 0.87
[0.270] [0.059] [0.520] [0.623]
Number of Beds 0.016*** 0.004*** -0.038*** -0.039***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.006]
Private pay share -1.389 -0.294 12.951*** 19.042***
[0.895] [0.197] [1.769] [2.238]
Medicaid Only -1.172 -0.193 2.347
[1.100] [0.271] [3.327]
Medicare Only -2.482*** -0.607*** 1.971 4.435**
[0.887] [0.209] [1.611] [1.969]
Ln(Income) 3.602*** 1.094*** 0.739 0.689
[0.762] [0.165] [1.238] [1.569]
HHI Index 10.293*** 2.213*** 23.647*** 25.790***
[1.595] [0.324] [2.156] [2.854]
Pou. > 65 -0.678*** -0.126*** -0.131 -0.064
per mile2(,000) [0.175] [0.039] [0.265] [0.349]
Constant -16.195* -7.622*** 71.908*** 68.182***
[8.383] [1.810] [13.593] [17.284]
State Fixed Effect
√ √ √ √
State Time Trend
√ √ √ √
R2 0.155 0.144 0.151 0.145
N 21419 21419 16142 14069
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the facility level to account for within facility het-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: Pro-cyclical Mental Health








GDP Growth Ratet−1 -0.073**
[0.029]
Ln(Leverage)t−2 0.026







Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the facility level to account for within facility hetero-
geneity.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financial Leverage and Hospital Technology
Adoption
3.1 Introduction
The Detroit Medical Center (DMC) says that while it has made money for seven
years, it can’t attract donor or investment money for key projects it needs to renovate
its aging facilities or to build new ones, such as Cardiovascular Institute or expansion
of Children’s Hospital of Michigan. As a result, 40% of the people who live near the
DMC campus or near its Sinai-Grace Hospital in northwest Detroit leave for care in
the suburbs - even though the DMC has some of the state’s top ranked physicians.
Detroit Free Press, March 20th 2010
This paper investigates the effects of financial leverage on hospitals’ pro-
duction decisions, particularly on the adoption of capital-intensive technology. One
consequence of using high financial leverage is that it may deplete borrowing capacity
and face the difficulty of raising additional funds. In addition, high interest expenses
can also crowd out the funds for other operating activities. For example, Matsa
(2011) finds that high leverage undermines supermarket firms product quality. In the
hospital industry, high financial leverage can also hinder hospitals ability to replace
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their aging facilities and outdated technology. A 2000 merger between Detroit Med-
ical Center (DMC) and Vanguard Healthcare System demonstrated that in extreme
cases the consequences can be so severe that they lead to an ownership transaction.1
While extensive studies have discussed the association between financial per-
formance and undesired consequences, most focus on hospitals’ profitability. Several
studies have examined the effects of profitability on hospital performance and found
weak or mild relationships. For example, Bazzoli and colleagues (2008) find a weak
relationship between profitability and quality of patient care and Shen (2002) reports
that hospitals with higher financial pressures have adverse health outcomes in the
short run but not over the long term. Overall, in constrast to general perceptions,
previous studies have concluded that profitability has only limited impacts on the
delivery of health services.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether poor financial decisions lead to undesired
health consequences or whether the causality actually goes in the opposite direction
(i.e., the poor hospital operational performance leads to financial distress). This
paper differs from the literature by investigating the casualty of financial leverage on
hospital operations. In particularly, I focus on the impacts of financial leverage on
adoption of capital-intensive technology.
To facilitate the empirical analysis, I obtain key financial information from
a California hospital dataset and technology adoption variables from the American
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey. To establish a causal relationship be-
tween financial leverage and technology adoption, I also interact financial leverage
with hospitals exposure to the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate. This approach is
similar to Zingales’s (1998) paper in which he uses Carter administration’s deregula-
tion to examine whether highly leveraged truck firms are more likely to be financially
constrained. The retrofit mandate requires hospitals to replace or improve buildings
1Vanguard Healthcare System agreed to retire $368.1 million of DMC bonds and other long-term
debt and invest up to $850 million in capital projects.
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that are exposed to significant seismic risks. Because most hospitals were built be-
fore the mandate was enforced, the exposure to seismic risks serves as an exogenous
financial shock that crowds out the financial resources available for operating activ-
ities and clinical investments. The interaction term between the existing financial
leverage and exposure to seismic risks provides the information about whether the
retrofit mandate has differential impacts for highly leveraged hospitals than for less
leveraged hospitals.
Overall, I find no significant relationship between the level of financial lever-
age and adoption of radiology technology. The insignificant results are consistent for
both simple probit regressions and the exogenous financial shock model. However,
the results should be interpreted with caution. Only about 200 hospitals are available
in this analysis. Therefore, it is possible that the insignificant results coming from the
small sample size. Incorporating more hospitals in other states will be an important
extension.
3.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development
This paper focuses on one of the negative consequences of debt financing:
High financial leverage can lead to financial constraints. Tirole (2006) provides the
theoretical perspective in which he incorporates moral hazard and agency cost to
explain that high-debt firms will be more likely to be credit constrained because
over-leverage may distort the incentives of entrepreneurs to misbehave at the cost of
lenders. If over-leverage does lead to financial constraints, a highly leveraged orga-
nization will have limited access to external capital to finance an investment project
that would otherwise generate positive returns. Dranove et al. (2013) finds that
hospitals are likely to postpone technology improvements when they face a lump-sum
financial shock. Therefore, one may expect highly leveraged hospitals to be less likely
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to adopt capital-intensive technology because they are more likely to be financially
constrained and because interest expense can crowd out funds available for technol-
ogy investments. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1a: Hospitals with high existing financial leverage are less likely to adopt
capital-intensive technology.
However, on the other hand, a highly leveraged hospital can be more aggressive
in adopting technology to generate cash flows from the more profitable services. Be-
cause hospitals often have objectives beyond profit maximization, they provide both
profitable and unprofitable services. Horwitz and Nichols (2009) identify relatively
profitable and unprofitable hospital services. The more profitable services include
computed-assisted tomography (CT) scans, diagnostic radioisotope facilities and the
radiation therapy, positron emission tomography, and ultrasound. Most of these ser-
vices require significant investments in medical technology. The relatively unprofitable
services include the emergency department, hospice, and psychiatric services. There-
fore, because of the difficulty of raising external capital, a highly leveraged hospital
may actually be more likely to adopt medical technology to provide more profitable
services and forgo less profitable services. This leads to a competing hypothesis as
follows:
H1b: Hospitals with high existing financial leverage are more likely to adopt
capital-intensive technology that are used for more profitable services.
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3.2.1 Competitive Effects of Financial Leverage
An organizations leverage level does not affect only its own operating activ-
ities. Researchers have expressed interests in the implications of financial leverage
on product market competition. For example, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) find
that highly leveraged grocery stories face severe liquidity constraints and are more
sensitive to operating cash flows. Compared to unconstrained stores, constrained
stores charge higher prices and further soften the price competition in local markets.
Furthermore, they find that new entrants also target the constrained incumbents and
initiate price competition to force the latter to exit. Khanna and Tice (2004) use a
different sample of discount department stores and find similar results. In contrast,
Busse (2002) finds that airlines with poor financial condition are more likely to start
price wars; Zingales (1998) uses data from the trucking industry and finds that when
the market becomes more competitive, highly leveraged firms are associated with less
capital expenditure and lower prices, and they are more likely to exit. Overall, the
literature has documented that financial leverage interact with product market deci-
sions but the specific impacts depend on the market structure and industry details.
Following the literature, one may expect that highly leveraged hospitals are less likely
to adopt medical technology and thus have a competitive disadvantage versus hospi-
tals with a lower leverage level. This leads to hypothesis 2:
H2: Hospitals with high existing financial leverage are less likely to adopt capital-
intensive technology that is used for profitable services.
3.2.2 For-Profit vs. Not-For-Profit Ownership
One prominent feature of the hospital industry is the mix between for-profit
and not-for-profit ownership. In addition to many researchers who have studied the
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differences among the objective functions of the two organizational forms, for-profits
and not-for-profits also have their advantages and disadvantages in raising capital.
Compared to for-profit hospitals, not-for-profits have the advantage of lower costs
through tax-exempt debt financing and are mostly constrained for equity financing.
Also, it is some what easier for not-for-profits to receive donations as an alternative
method of financing. For-profit hospitals, like other for-profit corporations, can raise
funds through both equity and debt markets. Despite these differences, because not-
for-profits have more limited equity-financing channels, with equal financial leverage
levels, not-for-profits are more likely to be financially constrained than for-profits.
Reiter, Wheeler, and Smith (2008) finds that when borrowing capacity is binding,
highly leveraged not-for-profit hospitals reduce their capital expenditures. Overall,
one may expect to see that financial leverage has larger impacts on not-for-profits.
Thus, I propose hypothesis 3:
H3: Highly leveraged not-for-profit hospitals are less likely to adopt medical tech-
nology than for-profits with an equal leverage level.
3.2.3 Revenue Growth
One way to examine whether financial leverage leads to competitive disad-
vantages is to compare the revenue growth between the highly leveraged and the less
leveraged hospitals (Campello 2006; Zhu 2011). Much of the capital-intensive medi-
cal equipment is required for the hospitals to provide profitable services. Therefore,
if financial leverage does hinder the adoption of medical technology, one should also
observe slower revenue growth for highly leveraged hospitals. Thus, I propose hy-
pothesis 4:
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H4: The revenue growth of highly leveraged hospitals is slower than that of
hospitals with low financial leverage.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data
As acknowledged in the field of health care finance, reliable and detailed
hospital financial statement information has been the major challenge in conducting
empirical analysis (Magnus and Smith 2000). Researchers often make the trade-off
between the detailed but small state dataset and the large but unaudited national
sample. This study focuses on California hospitals because of the availability of
reliable hospital financial statement information and a potentially exogenous financial
shock from the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate. In addition to financial data,
I obtain technology adoption data from the AHA Annual Survey, which provides
detailed information on the adoption of major medical technology, particularly on
capital-intensive radiology services. I also include the Area Resource File to control
for market-level variables such as the county median income. The Healthcare Cost
and Utilization Project’s State Inpatient Dataset (HCUP-SID) is also used to account
for heterogeneous patient mixes among the hospitals.
3.3.2 Hospital Financial Data
California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
has collected audited hospital financial statements annually since 1976 and this dataset
has been used extensively in previous studies. I extract both financial and non-
financial hospital variables from this dataset. The hospital characteristics include
ownership type, number of hospital beds, and teaching or rural status. The system
affiliation information is obtained from the California Hospital Project, administrated
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by Center for Health Financing, Policy, and Management at University of Southern
California. For meaningful comparison, I restrict the analysis sample to short-term
general acute care hospitals (ST-GACs) because specialty hospitals and long-term
GAC hospitals provide significantly different services. About 300 hospitals are in the
sample and 67.1% of them are affiliated with healthcare systems. Of the hospitals
24.4% are for-profit and 70.6% not-for-profit. On average, a hospital has 199.2 avail-
able beds. Only 5.9% of the hospitals are teaching hospitals and 18.2% are rural.
3.3.3 Financial Performance
Financial leverage (debt-over-asset ratio) is the primary financial variable that
is used in the analysis. Because I focus on financial constraints as the main conse-
quences of financial leverage, I also use other financial measures, including cash flow
from operating activities and interest expenses to examine whether the results from
leverage analysis are consistent and robust.
3.3.3.1 Ex-ante financial leverage
The financial leverage ratio is defined as the total liability over the total as-
set, the broadest definition of financial leverage. Because the exogenous financial
shock, the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate, has only been effectively enforced
since 2001, I use the financial leverage ratio in 1999 as the proxy for the leverage
level prior to the financial shock. California hospitals have financial leverage with a
ratio of the mean of 0.63. About 68.6% of hospitals have a debt-to-assets ratio above
50% and 23.4% have negative equity value. California not-for-profit hospitals have
slightly higher financial leverage than for-profits (0.58 vs. 0.65). The hospitals with
higher financial leverage are generally smaller. Hospitals with negative equity value
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have 177.4 available beds on average, compared to 199.2 available beds for the entire
sample
3.3.3.2 Operating Cash Flow over Total Asset
I use the ratio of operating cash flow over assets to measure the ability to
generate cash flow internally. According to pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf ,
1984), with the presence of informational asymmetry between managers and investors,
internal funds are preferred to external debt and equity financing. If financial leverage
leads to financial constraints and cause a slower adoption of medical technology, one
should expect to find that technology adoption is also positively related to operating
cash flow. I divide net cash flow from operating activities by total assets. In the
sample, the average ratio of operating cash flow over total assets is around 5.9%.
3.3.3.3 Interest Expense over Total Debt
Historical borrowing costs can be measured as the total interest expense over
total debt. Because the calculation includes both old and new debt, the ratio does
not necessarily reflect the present cost of borrowing. In addition, because the interest
expense is a before-tax measure, the calculation does not take the tax-deduction
benefits into consideration (for for-profit hospitals). However, all else being equal,
the higher ratio may indicate higher financing costs in general for affected hospitals.
These higher financing costs may reflect higher relative risk associated with these
hospitals or serious imperfect information between these hospitals and lenders. In
the sample, the interest rate of an average hospital is about 3.3%.
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3.3.3.4 Measure of Profitability
To demonstrate that financial leverage has effects on technology adoption
that are independent of profitability, it is important to control for the heterogeneous
profitability among hospitals. I use the operating margin as the measure for hospital
profitability. The ratio is defined as operating profits over revenue. It provides a
basic understanding of the profitability of each hospital. In the sample, the average
operating margin is -1.4%.
3.3.3.5 Technology Adoption
The main outcome of interest is the adoption of capital-intensive medical
technology. In particular, I focus on the technology required for highly profitable
services. Information about technology adoption is obtained from the AHA An-
nual Survey. I select four types of therapeutic and diagnostic technologies, including
the shaped beam radiation system, stereotactic radiosurgery, 64 slice CT scan, and
positron emission tomography. Such medical technologies can cost from several mil-
lions to hundreds of millions of dollars. Their prevalence is 22.3%, 21%, 19.7%, and
17.9%, respectively.
3.3.3.6 Market and Patient Characteristics
Other important control variables include market and patient characteristics.
I use the health referral regions (HRRs) as the definition of hospital markets. The
HRR data are obtained from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care and there are 28
HRRs in California. According to the Dartmouth Atlas, HRRs represent regional
health care markets for tertiary medical care that generally requires the services of
a major referral center. Because capital-intensive medical technology is often used in
major procedures, HRRs are the preferred definition of hospital markets because the
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regions are defined as where patients are referred for intensive procedures2. Because
more than 60% of the hospitals are affiliated with multi-facility systems, I adjust
for the system affiliation in calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). For
example, two hospitals that belong to the same health system are combined as one
organization in the calculation. The system-adjusted HHI is 0.35. From the Area Re-
source Files, I extract the county-level average income. The mean is about $37,309. I
also use the HCUP inpatient dataset to control for several patient-level characteristics
that are aggregated at the hospital-level. These variables include average patient age,
percentage of patients who are female, and percentage of patient who are white. On
average, the patients are 48.2 years old, 59.9% of them are female, and 51.4% of them
are white.
3.3.4 Exogenous Financial Shock
The endogeneity problem between financial leverage and product market out-
comes is well noted in the literature. Financial arrangements and product market de-
cisions can affect each other and these two decisions are often made simultaneously.
To account for endogeneity, previous studies have adopted exogenous shocks that
affect either financial decisions or production choices, but not both. For example,
Chevalier (1995; 1996) use leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the supermarket industry
to examine the effect of financial leverage on product markups. Zingales (1998) uses
the Carter admnistration’s deregulation to examine effects of market competition on
highly leveraged and financially constrained trucking firms. Lamont (1997) uses the
1986 oil price decrease to examine the capital expenditure of nonoil subsidiaries of oil
companies.
In the hospital context, all else being equal, less leveraged hospitals may
have better access to external capital that can be used to renovate buildings and
2http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/
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adopt capital intensive medical technology. Such activities provide the hospitals with
product market advantages in competing with hospitals with high existing leverage.
On the other hand, unfavorable product market situations can adversely affect the
level of financial leverage. For example, chronic operating losses may erode equity
and inflate the ratio of financial leverage; a pessimistic product market outlook may
discourage equity investors and constrain the financing channels. These two forces
can bolster each other and the causal relationship between financial leverage and
product market outcomes becomes difficult to disentangle.
To account for the endogeneity problem, I follow Chang and Jacobson (2010),
using the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate as the exogenous financial shock that
applies to most of California’s GACs. Because the financial burdens from this seismic
retrofit mandate are independent of hospitals profitability and clinical performance, it
is ideal for studying the effect of financial leverage on hospitals technology adoption
decisions. This mandate requires GAC hospitals to improve building strength to
fulfill earthquake safety requirements. Depending on the age and structure of the
buildings and their geographic location, the government of California government has
classified GAC hospitals into different risk categories. Each category requires different
levels of capital expenditures to retrofit or rebuild the buildings to satisfy the safety
requirements. Because the average building age can be potentially endogenous to
whether the hospitals are financially constrained, I only use the geographic seismic
risk factor as the proxy for the exogenous financial shock. As Chang and Jacobson
did in their paper, I first use Geographic Information System (GIS) to determine each
hospital’s coordinates and use the coordinates to locate and calculate each hospital’s
peak ground acceleration (PGA) factor. Because the PGA factors highly correlate
with the earthquake belt, the distribution of high-PGA hospitals is concentrated in
certain areas (the Bay Area and Los Angeles). Therefore, most PGA hospitals will
probably locate in the same areas and low-PGA hospitals will locate in the same
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regions. To examine the market competition perspective of the seismic shock, I also
calculate the relative risk measures that categorize the hospitals with a higher (lower)
risk factor than the average seismic risk of the market in which the hospital resides.
Both the absolute and relative values of the seismic risk are included in the analysis.
3.3.5 California Seismic Retrofit Mandate
This paragraph provides a description of key time lines and the magnitude
of the retrofit mandate. SB 1953 originally passed in 1994 after the Northridge
earthquake to regulate the safety of hospital buildings. The most seismic-vulnerable
GAC buildings (SPC-1) had to be retrofit, replaced, or removed from GAC services by
2008. In the initial report in 2001, 1,027 hospital buildings fell into SPC-1 categories
(total hospital buildings 2,627). In 2002, SB 1801 passed, which permits a five-year
extension of the first deadline of 2008. Almost every hospital requested an extension of
the deadline from 2008 to 2013. According to the OSHPD report 3, by the end of 2009,
70% of SPC-1 buildings were likely to comply, 13% were possible to comply, and 17%
are possibly non-compliant. The non-compliant buildings have to be removed from
general acute care services. Because the planning process and the actual construction
time for hospital buildings can take several years, capital expenditures drastically
increased as early as 2006 (See Figure 3.1). The estimated total capital expenditures
related to the retrofit mandate varies and is as high as $41.7 billion (Meade et al.,
2002). Successful compliance with the seismic retrofit mandate not only ensures the
continuation of hospital operations, it can also affect the cost of borrowing and the
hospital’s competitive advantage. For example, Moody’s upgraded the bond rating
of Good Samaritan Hospital in September 2011 because Good Samaritan satisfies
the seismic safety requirement through 2030. Compliance with the seismic retrofit
mandate is one of the important considerations in Moodys several bond rating reports.
3Seismic Safety Hearing (http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/SeismicSafetyHearing.pdf)
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Furthermore, Sutter, University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center, and
University of California at San Francisco Medical Center, which have the financial
resources to comply with the retrofit mandates, have highlighted their successful
compliance with the regulations on their web pages and in their annual reports. This
might serve as a signal to payers and patients to differentiate between hospitals that
have not or are not able to comply with the mandate.
3.3.6 Empirical Specification
I use two empirical specifications in the paper a simple lagged model and a
model that interacts with the exogenous financial shock. The basic empirical specifi-
cation is as follows:
Yi,t = βFLi,t−7 + γXHi,t−7 + λMm,t−7 + ΘPi,t + ε (3.1)
Where Yi,t is the outcome of interest (prices or technology adoption) for hospital
i at year t (2006). FL i, t is the financial leverage for hospital i at year t-7 (1999).
Financial leverage is the primary variable of interest; thus, I also use the operat-
ing cash flow over assets ratio and interest expense over debt ratios as robustness
checks. In the basic model, I use the financial leverage ratio in 1999, a year prior
to the first evaluation of the exposure to seismic retrofit. Because the major con-
struction has taken place since 2000, to some extent, the hospitals’ financial leverage
should be independent of their seismic risks. For the technology adoption variables,
I use the prevalence in 2006 because the hospitals should already have started their
seismic retrofit projects and the related financial shock should already be reflected
in their decisions, regarding the adoption of medical technology. In addition, using
the technology prevalence in 2006 also helps to avoid complications from the 2007
financial crisis. XHi,t−7 represents the basic set of hospital characteristics including
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ownership types ( i.e., for-profit versus not-for-profit), the number of hospital beds,
system affiliation, and teaching/rural status. These variables are based on the 1999
information because of the concern that hospital-level variables may change when the
seismic retrofit construction projects begin. Mm,t−6 is the hospital market-level char-
acteristics4, such as the HHI concentration level and median county income. Pi,t+1
represents patient-level characteristics at 2006 to account for the differential patient
case mix among hospitals.
The alternative specification interacts the seismic risk with the financial lever-
age before the mandate is effectively enforced. The focus is on the interaction term
of the seismic risk and existing financial leverage.
Yi,t = βFLi,t−7 + δHighRisk+φFLi,t−7 ∗HighRisk+γXHi,t−7 +λMm,t−7 +ΘPi,t+ ε
(3.2)
In this equation, High Risk represents two variables: the absolute and relative
values of seismic risk. The absolute seismic risk is the hospitals PGA factor. For the
relative seismic risk, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the hospital has
a higher seismic risk relative to the market average (hospital referral regions). The
interaction term of financial leverage and seismic risk suggests that seismic risk may
have disproportionate impacts on hospitals that use higher financial leverage. Fur-
thermore, because hospitals that face high (low) seismic risk may have very different
decision processes, I also run a fully interacted model to examine whether financial
leverage has differential effects for hospitals facing high (low) fixed cost shocks. I split
the sample into high and low seismic risk categories, in which the hospitals in the
high (low) risk category face higher (lower) fixed cost shocks than their competitors
within the same HRR. In this fully interacted model, I expect to see that financial
leverage has negative consequences on technology adoption for hospitals that have
4hospital market level characteristics are calculated on all short-term GAC hospitals within each
health referral region.
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The literature documents that financial leverage can cause lower capital ex-
penditures. This paper tries to provide direct evidence of the impact of leverage on
technology adoption. Examination of the hospital markets provides a unique oppor-
tunity because of the availability of rich and detailed information on the adoption of
medical technology at the individual hospital level. The main hypothesis is that a
hospital with high leverage is more likely to be financially constrained and will have
fewer financial resources for technology investments. Meanwhile, there is an alter-
native hypothesis that financially constrained hospitals may be more likely to adopt
such medical technologies. Capital-intensive medical technologies are also often used
to perform lucrative services with higher profit margins. The alternative hypothesis
can be that hospitals with higher existing leverage level are faster to adopt medical
technology so as to generate additional operating cash flows. The probit regression
is used in the analysis and the marginal effects (Ai and Norton, 2003) are reported
in the tables. Table 3.2 shows the results from the basic model. The leverage ra-
tio has a negative relationship with the adoption of shaped beam radiation, 64-slice
CT scan, and positron emission tomography. However, surprisingly, the results are
not statistically significant. Consistent with previous studies, operating margins and
the number of hospital beds are positively correlated with technology adoption. The
number of hospital beds is significant at the 1% level for all four types of technology.
To ensure that the results are not endogenous and biased, I also run an alternative
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model with an exogenous seismic shock. The alterative set of results is reported in
Table 3.3. Similarly, leverage has a negative but not statistically significant relation-
ship with adoption. The results on the interaction terms are mixed and insignificant.
Table 3.4 also shows similar results. Among the regressions, operating margin and
number of hospital beds are significantly positively correlated with adoption. One
interesting result is that hospitals affiliated with hospital systems are less likely to
adopt all four types of radiology technology. It would be worth investigating the role
of system affiliation in technology adoption.
3.4.2 Revenue Growth
For each hospital, I also compute the revenue growth over the seven-year pe-
riod from 1999 through 2006. The revenue, on average, increases drastically by about
137.6%. The regressions are reported in Table 3.5. In column (1), the leverage ratio
and absolute value of seismic risk have negative and insignificant relationships with
revenue growth. From columns (2) and (4), coefficients of the interaction of leverage
and absolute seismic risk are negative and significant. Thus, seismic risks have a large
and negative effect on revenue growth for highly leveraged hospitals. Because the re-
sults of technology regressions are not significant, I cannot make too many inferences
regarding the pathway of lower revenue growth. Prices and patient mix can be one
direction for future research.
3.4.3 Ownership Status: for-profit versus not-for-profit
To examine whether financial leverage has differential effects on technology
adoption for for-profits or not-for-profits, I include the interaction term of financial
leverage and the indicator variable of for-profit status. The results are presented in
Table 3.6. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative across all four regressions.
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This suggests that leverage has larger impacts for for-profit hospitals. However, the
result is only statistically significant in the positron emission tomography regression
and should be interpreted with caution. In fact, the negative sign on the coefficient
of the interaction term is the opposite of what the hypothesis will predict. This
result is similar to Magnus et al.(2004a), in which they suggest that the association
between debt and capital-investment may be weaker because the creditors oversight
is less tight in the not-for-profit setting and the tax-exempt debt at times is tied
to capital-investment legal requirement. One potential explanation is that not-for-
profit hospitals balance between profits and community benefits. When not-for-profits
do not face immediate financial pressures, they tradeoff some profits for community
benefits, to be better quality or more quantity. Thus, when a highly leveraged not-
for-profit is affected by the seismic retrofit mandate, it can provide less community
to yield sufficient cash flow internally. In fact, Chang and Jacobson (2010) find that
not-for-profits that are more seriously impacted by the retrofit mandate, increase the
utilization of imaging services to finance the retrofit costs. Thus, compared to for-
profits, not-for-profits are more able to adjust the mix between profitable and less
profitable service when they are liquidity constrained.
3.4.4 Overall Discussion
Based on the results from the basic model and the model using the seismic
retrofit mandate, I do not find significant relationship between financial leverage and
technology adoption. I also repeat the same analysis using other financial measures,
including operating cash flow over total asset and interest expense over total debt.
The results are presented in Table 3.7 and I do not find consistent relationship with
these two financial measures and technology adoption. Because the results are statis-
tically insignificant, I cannot disentangle the two competing hypothesis that financial
leverage leads to financial constraints or financial leverage distorts hospitals incentive
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to adopt technology. Despite the insignificant results, the provision of health care is
similar to providing a public good. Because financial leverage has consistent negative
effects on for-profit hospitals, it may be worthy to have policy-makers discuss solu-
tions for already highly leveraged for-profit hospitals or to regulate and prevent the
for-profits from being over-leveraged.
3.5 Limitations and Future Work
3.5.1 Empirical Analysis
There are two major limitations of this paper: the small sample size and
compliance with the seismic retrofit mandate. Because this study only uses California
data and the unit of analysis focuses on the hospital level, the analysis sample at
most consists of 250 hospitals. Furthermore, because the variations in the financial
leverage are small between years, the dataset is not ideal for constructing panel data
for a hospital fixed-effect analysis. Such a small sample limits the possibility of
using different econometric techniques and running different robust analyses. Second,
although the California Seismic Retrofit Mandate seems to be an exogenous financial
shock, there are concerns that the hospitals are not bound by the mandate. In
particular, the initial mandate requires enormous financial resources that are beyond
many hospitals’ financial capablities. The mandate’s compliance deadline has been
extended several times and there have also been several special arrangements between
the government of California and hospitals to finance the construction projects. This
concern may explain the insignificant results of the model that uses the seismic retrofit
mandate. In future studies, one might want to consider using a national sample that
comprises more hospitals or changing the unit of analysis from the California hospital
level to the patient level.
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3.5.2 Welfare Implications
This paper has not discussed the potential impacts of financial leverage on
quality of care and the provision of uncompensated care (Magnus et al., 2004b), two
dimensions with strong welfare implications. Since the HCUP-SID is already used in
this study, it will be a natural extension to examine the long-term impacts of financial
leverage on the quality of care at the individual patient level.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the effects of financial leverage on technology adoption.
Although I am not able to establish a solid causal relationship between financial lever-
age and the probability of adopting radiology technology, I do find the adoption is
significantly correlated with the hospital size and operating margin. More interest-
ingly, I also find a consistent and negative relationship between system affiliations
and technology adoption. This inverse relationship may provide evidence of the cen-
tralization of capital-intensive technology within health systems. It will be worth to
pursue a further study of evaluating the efficiency gains through the centralization of
medical technology.
Another interesting finding is that financial leverage has more significant im-
pacts on for-profit hospitals than not-for-profits. While not-for-profits rely more on
debt-financing (Reiter et al., 2008), they also have the flexibility to adjust the ser-
vice mix between highly profitable and less profitable service during the financial
hardship. Thus, financial leverage may not have significant impacts on technology
adoption of not-for-profits, but it can still lead to undesired consequences in quality
and quantity. Because of the small sample size of this study, it is difficult to conclude
that financial leverage does not have impacts on technology adoption, or the lack of
statistical power leads to the insignificant results. In the sample, about 23.4% of the
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hospitals have negative equity, which means that the book value of debts exceeds the
book value of total assets. It will be interesting to examine whether hospitals with
negative equity are also prevalent in other states. To sum up, this paper calls for
more attention to reviewing the role of financial leverage in the hospital industry.
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Figure 3.1: CAPEX per Licensed Bed 2000-2011 (pegged to 2011 dollars)
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Min Max Obs
Technology Adoption
Shaped beam Radiation System 0.223 0.417 0 1 229
Stereotactic Radiosurgery 0.21 0.408 0 1 229
64 Slice CT Scan 0.197 0.398 0 1 229
Poistron Emission Tomography 0.179 0.384 0 1 229
Others
∆ Market Share 0.006 0.03 -0.207 0.153 276
Revenue Growth 1.376 0.819 -0.128 4.721 276
Financial Measures
Leverage Ratio 0.629 0.384 0.043 2.399 314
Operating Margin -0.014 0.11 -0.379 0.262 315
Operating Cashflow/Asset 0.059 0.132 -0.468 0.587 315
Interest Expense/Debt 0.033 0.028 0 0.234 281
Hospital Characteristics
Absolute Value of Seismic Risk 0.405 0.193 0 0.95 324
Relative Value of Seismic Risk 0.456 0.499 0 1 340
Hospital Beds (in 100) 1.992 1.389 0.1 8.49 340
Public Hospital 0.05 0.218 0 1 340
For-Profit Hospital 0.244 0.43 0 1 340
System Affiliation 0.671 0.471 0 1 340
Teaching Hospital 0.059 0.236 0 1 340
Rural Hospital 0.182 0.387 0 1 340
Market Characteristics
HHI Index 0.35 0.246 0 1.248 340
ln(County Income) 10.527 0.273 10.025 11.363 335
Patient Characteristics
Avg. Age 48.149 10.979 11.942 76.077 288
Perct. of Female 0.599 0.058 0.272 0.785 288
Perct. of White 0.514 0.232 0.001 0.944 288
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Table 3.2: Leverage on Technology Adoption - Marginal Effects of Probit Model
Beam Stereotactic 64-Slice Poistron Emission
Radiation Radiosurgery CT Scan Tomography
Leverage Ratio -0.086 0.037 -0.018 -0.003
[0.097] [0.051] [0.090] [0.079]
Operating Margin 0.676** 0.304 -0.24 0.206
[0.290] [0.396] [0.260] [0.243]
# of Hospital Beds (100) 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.043*** 0.069***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.022]
For-Profit Hospital -0.107* -0.01 -0.138* -0.154
[0.064] [0.077] [0.072] [0.103]
Public Hospital N.A. -0.294* -0.115 -0.147
[0.152] [0.120] [0.104]
System Affiliation -0.102** -0.131** -0.094* -0.008
[0.050] [0.064] [0.051] [0.050]
Teaching Hospital -0.043 -0.027 0.026 -0.102
[0.111] [0.103] [0.111] [0.127]
Rural Hospital -0.159 -0.01 -0.151** 0.046
[0.126] [0.078] [0.075] [0.091]
HHI Index -0.002 0.034 0.103 0.09
[0.104] [0.109] [0.085] [0.128]
ln(County Income) 0.032 -0.096 0.099 0.072
[0.117] [0.123] [0.091] [0.095]
Avg. Age -0.002 -0.006 -0.011*** -0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Perct. of Female 0.009 -0.65 -0.966* -0.12
[0.508] [0.775] [0.514] [0.427]
Perct. of White 0.196* 0.245** 0.435*** -0.044
[0.108] [0.109] [0.126] [0.082]
N 193 203 203 203
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the health referral region level to account for the within
market heterogeneity.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Financial Leverage and Seismic Risk on Market Share and Revenue Growth
Revenue Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage Ratio -0.046 0.256 -0.04 0.228
[0.144] [0.171] [0.145] [0.167]
Absolute Value of Seismic Risk -0.024 0.575 -0.202 0.447
[0.216] [0.378] [0.235] [0.368]
Relative Value of Seismic Risk 0.121* 0.03
[0.071] [0.109]
Leverage Ratio -0.901** -0.974**
X Absolute Seismic Risk [0.436] [0.440]
Leverage Ratio 0.146
X Relative Seismic Risk [0.167]
Operating Margin -1.678** -1.653** -1.637** -1.602**
[0.674] [0.668] [0.664] [0.664]
# of Hospital Bed (in 100) -0.056 -0.055 -0.052 -0.05
[0.035] [0.036] [0.034] [0.036]
Public Hospital -0.228 -0.209 -0.219 -0.187
[0.160] [0.170] [0.160] [0.175]
For-Profit Hospital -0.241*** -0.248*** -0.237*** -0.237**
[0.088] [0.092] [0.089] [0.093]
System Affiliation 0.348** 0.349** 0.340** 0.338**
[0.138] [0.140] [0.141] [0.145]
Teaching Hospital -0.045 -0.031 -0.043 -0.025
[0.145] [0.153] [0.142] [0.149]
Rural Hospital -0.415*** -0.411*** -0.410*** -0.403***
[0.135] [0.126] [0.133] [0.123]
HHI Index -0.042 -0.046 -0.088 -0.088
[0.262] [0.266] [0.255] [0.259]
ln(County Income) -0.250* -0.247* -0.205 -0.203
[0.148] [0.148] [0.146] [0.148]
Avg. Age -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Perct. of Female -0.504 -0.442 -0.411 -0.271
[0.989] [1.005] [1.012] [1.056]
Perct. of White 0.226 0.245 0.202 0.241
N 256 256 256 256
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the health referral region level to account for the within
market heterogeneity.
Note (3) HHI is adjusted for chain-affiliation.
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Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of Financial Leverage and Ownership Types on Technol-
ogy Adoption
Beam Stereotactic 64-Slice Poistron Emission
Radiation Radiosurgery CT Scan Tomography
Leverage Ratio -0.119 -0.024 -0.07 -0.152*
[0.122] [0.083] [0.108] [0.081]
For-Profit Hospital 0.103 0.151 0.009 0.601***
[0.174] [0.168] [0.156] [0.170]
Leverage Ratio -0.157 -0.089 -0.14 -0.611***
X For-Profit [0.109] [0.118] [0.094] [0.202]
Operating Margin 0.701** 0.259 -0.425 0.229
[0.306] [0.439] [0.295] [0.299]
Hospital Beds (in 100) 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.048*** 0.072***
[0.018] [0.016] [0.017] [0.023]
System Affiliation -0.097* -0.124** -0.082 0.012
[0.050] [0.061] [0.052] [0.049]
Teaching Hospital -0.044 -0.051 -0.049 -0.15
[0.110] [0.108] [0.116] [0.129]
Rural Hospital -0.162 0.002 -0.128* 0.068
[0.126] [0.076] [0.077] [0.092]
HHI Index -0.001 0.046 0.138* 0.095
[0.103] [0.106] [0.081] [0.139]
ln(County Income) 0.025 -0.121 0.117 0.001
[0.113] [0.127] [0.097] [0.086]
Avg. Age -0.001 -0.006 -0.012*** -0.001
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Perct. of Female 0.043 -0.889 -1.296*** -0.385
[0.500] [0.809] [0.459] [0.589]
Perct. of White 0.192* 0.232** 0.411*** -0.098
[0.105] [0.115] [0.134] [0.083]
N 193 193 193 193
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) all standard errors are clustered at the health referral region level to account for the within
market heterogeneity.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Managers’ Compensation in a Mixed Ownership
Industry
4.1 Introduction
Not-for-profit organizations, such as schools, associations, and health care
organizations, have become increasingly important in our economy. The total num-
ber of not-for-profit organizations has increased by 24% during the past decade. In
2010, about 2.3 million not-for-profits were operating in the U.S., and their economic
activities make up 5.5% of the U.S. GDP (Blackwood et al., 2012). Despite their sig-
nificant influence, not-for-profit organizations are a challenging subject for traditional
economic analysis, particularly because the non-distribution constraint prohibits not-
for-profits from distributing the profits back to the individuals who have control over
the organizations (Hansmann, 1980). This constraint contradicts the fundamental
profit-maximizing assumption and the motives of not-for-profit organizations remain
a puzzle. This paper investigates nursing home managers’ compensation and its re-
lationship with performance measures in order to provide new empirical evidence of
the difference between for-profits and not-for-profits.
Because not-for-profits have a prominent presence in the health care sector, the
performance objectives of not-for-profits has been a central research topic. About
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60% of hospitals (AHA 2013) and 27% of nursing homes (CMS , 2010) are not-for-
profits. Within the theoretical literature, it is common to assume that not-for-profits’
objective functions include dimensions beyond financial performance. For example,
not-for-profit hospitals maximize quality and quantity, subject to budget constraints
(Newhouse, 1970; Fledstein, 1971). Hirth (1999) assumes that not-for-profit nursing
homes maximize quality subject to non-distribution constraints. To test the theo-
retical predictions, most empirical work has examined the product market outcomes,
such as quality of care, charity care, and utilization. However, the empirical results
are rather mixed. For example, Sloan et al. (2001) find that for-profit hospitals have
higher costs than not-for-profits, but there is no difference in the quality provided.
Shen (2002) finds that fewer adverse outcomes occur among acute myocardial in-
farction patients at not-for-profit hospitals. A recent work by Chang and Jacobson
(2010) examines the provision of for-profit and not-for-profit services and rejects the
hypothesis that not-for-profits are either purely profit maximizing or social welfare
maximizing. However, the use of product market performance to estimate the mo-
tives of not-for-profits has its limitations. As noted by Norton and Staiger (1994),
ownership choices often interact with unobservable market-level characteristics. They
find that for-profit hospitals self-select into well-insured areas. Without controlling
for such self-selection problems, the estimate from a direct comparison between for-
profits and not-for-profits can be endogenous.
Alternatively, I directly test whether for-profits and not-for-profits place differ-
ent weights on financial and altruistic motives in deciding managers’ compensation.
Managers are contracted by the board of directors/trustees to act as the representa-
tive agents for the security owners (in for-profits) or the donors and communities (in
not-for-profits). Therefore, the managers should receive incentives that reflect the mo-
tives of their organizations. The idea is that if not-for-profits truly pursue objectives
beyond financial performance, other altruistic objectives should also be important in
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determining managers’ compensation. Similar strategies have been used in previous
studies to explore this topic. For example, Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) find that
compensation for top executives in for-profits is higher. They also examine the com-
pensation composition between base salaries and bonuses and find that bonuses are
absolutely and relatively greater in for-profits; Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) examine
the CEOs’ compensation structure and find that religious nonprofits pay significantly
higher base salaries, and secular nonprofits are more likely to provide bonuses and
incentive plans. Preyra and Pink (2001) find that, compared to the CEOs of publicly
traded companies, CEOs of non-profit hospitals earn significantly lower but much
more stable compensation.
Studying of managers’ incentives also helps to understand agency problems
across different organizational forms. As pointed out by Fama and Jensen (Fama,
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Fama and Jensen, 1983b), the separation of owner-
ship and management improves operating efficiency but also creates agency problems
because managers’ incentives may not be in line with residual claimants’ best in-
terests. Thus, performance-based compensation can be used to correct managers’
incentives and alleviate agency problems. Among for-profits, some of the managers
have significant ownership stakes (owner-managers), and others do not. When man-
agers also have significant ownership, the agency problems are not as severe, because
owner-managers can share part of the organizations’ net worth, and their incentives
are more in line with other residual claimants. Also, owner-managers may earn higher
compensation because of their influence on corporate policies. In terms of not-for-
profits, having no residual claimants does not exempt not-for-profits from agency
problems. Agency problems still exist between donors/communities and managers,
because managers may not use resources optimally to achieve donors’ or communi-
ties’ objectives. If not-for-profits truly pursue objectives beyond profit-maximization,
agency problems can be more pronounced in not-for-profits because it is more diffi-
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cult for the board to monitor and evaluate among multiple performance criteria. This
paper studies managers’ incentives to understand agency problems among for-profits
with owner-managers, for-profits with non-owner managers, and not-for-profits.
I also link the managers’ compensation to the product market structure to
test the hypothesis that product market competition can affect managers’ compensa-
tion. There are different schools of thought that provide different predictions about
the effect of competition on managers’ compensation. For example, product market
competition can serve as an alternative mechanism to motivate managers to make
optimal use of resources and mitigate agency problems (Giroud and Mueller , 2011);
meanwhile, more product market competition makes managerial talents more valuable
resources and can increase managers’ compensation (Gabaix and Landier , 2008; Bere-
skin and Cicero, 2013). This paper attempts to investigate the relationship between
the level and incentives of compensation and nursing home market competition. As
noted by Grabowski and Hirth (2003) and Horwitz and Nichols (2009), for-profit mar-
ket share can increase the intensity of the competition. I thus use both the for-profit
market share and conventional HHI index to define the intensity of competition.
The empirical analysis relies on a unique eight year dataset. I obtain audited
cost reports for nursing homes from the Ohio Department of Job and Family Ser-
vice. These reports provide detailed data and audited financial information related
to managers’ compensation and their ownership. All registered nursing homes in Ohio
are required to submit their cost reports annually. Therefore, I have compensation
and ownership information of all for-profit nursing homes at the establishment level.
This dataset presents a valuable opportunity which has not been available in most
prior research. Previous work has mostly accessed only data on compensation for
not-for-profits, not that of for-profits, or they rely on a single-year cross-sectional
survey. Furthermore, the Ohio data also provides information describing managers’
experience and educational background that can be used as proxies for ability.
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Overall, I find that owner-managers earn 22% higher compensation than not-
for-profit managers and for-profit/non-owner managers. There is no consistent rela-
tionship between compensation and either financial or altruistic performance. Rather,
managers’ compensation is positively correlated with directly observable character-
istics, including work experience, number of beds, occupancy rate, and payer mix.
However, the results should be interpreted with caution. The absence of a significant
relationships between compensation and performance does not necessarily indicate
that not-for-profits are not different from for-profits. Because managers’ turnover
is not included in the analysis, it is possible that the board replaces managers who
have poor performance rather than reduces their compensation. Also, the evalua-
tion and monitoring of financial and altruistic performance at the establishment level
can be too costly to the board, preventing managers’ compensation from reflecting
short-term performance.
4.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
The development of the conceptual framework focuses on the level of compen-
sation and the relationship between compensation and performance among three types
of managers: for-profit/owner-managers, for-profit/non-owner managers, and not-for-
profit managers. I start with the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit man-
agers, and then discuss the distinguishing factors between the managers who have
ownership and those who do not. I then link the level and the pay-for-performance
relationship of managers’ compensation to product market competition. Finally, I
discuss system-affiliation and its impacts on agency problems and performance-based
compensation.
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4.2.1 For-profits and Not-for-profits
Agency problems arise when ownership and management are separated. Start-
ing with the standard principal-agent model by Holmstrom (1979), the board is the
principal who writes a contract with the agent (the manager) to make optimal use
of resources, and to maximize the residual claimants’ welfare. However, because
managers’ effort is not perfectly observable and monitoring managers’ behavior is
often costly, managers may actually maximize their own benefits instead of residual
claimants’ welfare. Because it is not feasible to contract managers’ every effort, the
board has to seek a second-best alternative: pay for performance. Performance-based
compensation ties at least part of the managers’ compensation to observable out-
comes: for example, financial performance. In a profit-maximizing private firm, one
often assumes that managers’ compensation is tied to financial performance. This can
take the form of performance-based cash bonuses or stock options that supplement
base salaries. In a mixed ownership industry, the contract between the principal and
the agent becomes more complicated, because not-for-profits can have motives other
than profit-maximization. In addition, without residual claimants, it is unclear who
should determine not-for-profits’ objectives, and who should evaluate whether these
objectives are achieved.
Because this paper uses nursing home data in the empirical analysis, I discuss
the hypotheses in the context of the nursing home industry. For-profits and not-for-
profits are the two major organizational forms in the nursing home industry. For the
for-profit nursing homes, I assume that managers’ primary task is to maximize profits.
Thus, if the firms connect managers’ compensation to performance, managers’ com-
pensation should be at least partially tied to nursing homes’ financial performance.
On the other hand, the relationship between compensation and quality measures is
more ambiguous. Theoretically, quality performance only matters to for-profit nurs-
ing homes through its impact on financial performance. For example, good quality
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may attract consumers who are willing to pay higher prices, and good reputation is
an intangible asset that allows nursing homes to attract consumers in the long term.
Overall, it is possible that for-profit managers are indirectly rewarded for quality
which improves profitability. However, managers in for-profits should be less likely
rewarded for quality that is driven by altruistic motives.
On the other hand, the objective functions of the not-for-profit organizations
often include some altruistic dimensions such as quality, quantity, and community
services. Under these circumstances, it is more difficult to tie optimal manager time
and effort to each organizational objective. In the context of the nursing home in-
dustry, not-for-profit nursing homes are usually assumed to maximize some functions
of profits and quality. Although there are no residual claimants in not-for-profits,
earning profits is still an important goal, because profits supply financial resources
needed in order to provide services and quality of care. However, what sets not-for-
profits apart from for-profits is that better quality itself can be a direct objective,
even when quality already exceeds a profit-maximizing level. In not-for-profits, both
profit-maximizing and altruistic motives make quality an important objective.
H 1: Financial performance should have stronger influence on for-profit managers’
compensation than that of the not-for-profit managers’. On the other hand, quality
performance should have stronger influence on not-for-profit managers’ compensation
than that of the for-profit managers.
4.2.2 Owner-managers
Managers of for-profits can be further separated according to two different
types: those who have significant ownership (owner-managers) and those who do not
(non-owner managers). Owner-managers are considered to be inside block sharehold-
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ers who have significant equity stakes in the firms. Their incentives are different than
managers who do not have significant ownership (Holerness , 2003). To develop the
empirical hypotheses, I borrow the concepts from two different schools of thought:
the optimal contracting approach and the managerial power approach. The optimal
contracting model (Murphy , 1999; Core et al., 2003) suggests that, because owner-
managers can directly share a portion of the residual profits, the principal-agent
problem may be milder. Using a dataset of small corporations, Ang et al. (2000) find
that agency costs are inversely related to managers’ ownership share. Since there is
less need to use pay-for-performance to mitigate the agency problem, one may expect
that owner-managers’ compensation would be tied less to their performance (Mehran,
1995). A different perspective, the managerial power approach (Bebchuk and Fried ,
2003; Bebchuk and Fried , 2004), provides another hypothesis about owner-managers’
compensation. Because owner-managers have more influence on corporate policies,
they may be more likely to exercise their managerial power to collective private ben-
efits, including their own compensation (Holerness and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and
Holderness , 1989; Mikkelson and Regassa, 1991; Chang and Mayers , 1995; Nicodano
and Sembenelli , 2000).
In addition, compared to non-owner managers, owner-managers face higher risks
from their equity stake. Owner-managers can also exercise their managerial power
to raise compensation to reflect the investment uncertainty. The hypothesis about
owner-managers can be synthesized as follows:
H 2: Owner-managers earn higher compensation than non-owner managers; owner-
managers’ compensation is tied less to their performance.
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4.2.3 Link to Product Market Competition
It is ambiguous what are the net effects of product market competition on
the level and incentives of managers’ compensation. Product market competition can
affect the level and incentives of managers’ compensation in several ways. First, man-
agers’ skills and talents can be viewed as essential inputs in the production process.
Like other inputs, such as labor, capital, and raw materials, owners contract managers
for their managerial skills. When the product market becomes more competitive, the
returns to managerial skills increase and, thus, the firms are willing to pay higher
prices for managerial talents (Guadalupe, 2007; Gabaix and Landier , 2008). On the
other hand, product market competition reduces excess profits which might be shared
partially with the managers. The later hypothesis suggests that managers’ compen-
sation is inversely related with the intensity of product market competition. The
hypothesis related to competition and the level of compensation is as follows.
H 3a: Compensation can increase or decrease when the market is more competi-
tive
When firms evaluate whether to adopt performance-based compensation, prod-
uct market competition can be an important factor. Competition has two opposing
effects on the incentives of managers’ compensation. It has long been known to
economists that competition can be an effective discipline mechanism to reduce man-
agerial slack (Giroud and Mueller , 2010; Giroud and Mueller , 2011 ). That is, in
a perfectly competitive market, firms with incompetent managers will be forced to
exit the market, or firms face greater pressures to replace incompetent managers. On
the other hand, managers in monopolistic firms may not work as diligently as those
in competitive firms do (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Monopolistic managers
may not make optimal use of corporate resources as they will be less likely to be
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penalized by their competitors. One may also expect that agency problems are more
serious in the imperfectly competitive markets. Hence, firms in less competitive mar-
kets are more likely to adopt performance-based incentives to motivate managers and
to mitigate agency problems.
However, competition can also increases the value of managers’ efforts. Assum-
ing in a highly competitive market, a slightly difference in managers’ productivity can
results in significant differences in market share or cost reduction. Thus, in highly
competitive product markets, the firms may more likely to provide performance-based
incentives to motivate managers(Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005; Cunat and Guadalupe,
2009a; Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009b).
H 3b: Product market competition can be either negatively (lower agency costs)
or positively (higher value of managers’ efforts) correlated with the relationship be-
tween compensation and performance. The net effect is theoretically ambiguous.
Furthermore, in nursing home markets, for-profit market shares represent more
intense market competition on financial but not on quality dimensions (Hirth, 1999).
The competitive spillover effects of for-market share force nursing homes to trade-off
quality for financial gains. This leads to an interesting scenario that for-profit market
share has nonuniform effects on compensation incentives. Therefore, in a market that
is domnated by for-profit nurisng homes, managers’ compensation are more likely to
tied to financial performance but less to quality performance.
H 3c i: For-profit market share can increase or decrease managers’ compensation.
H 3c ii: In a market with higher for-profit market share, managers’ compensation is
more tied to the financial performance and less tied to quality measures.
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4.2.4 System-affiliation
Because about 59% of the nursing homes in the sample belong to multi-
facility systems, it is important to examine whether managers in system-affiliated
nursing homes face different incentives than those who work in independent nurs-
ing homes. Several reasons suggest that managers’ compensation in system-affiliated
nursing homes is more likely to be tied to performance. First, nursing home systems
are more complex organizations than independent facilities and may operate facilities
across different geographic markets and product segments. As pointed out by Fama
and Jensen (1983), agency problems become more pronounced when the organizations
become more complex. Second, managers in system-affiliated nursing homes are like
division managers within big enterprises. Because division managers are contracted
by top executives in headquarters and not directly by the principals, agency problems
are likely to be more severe between managers in system-affiliated nursing homes and
the residual claimants (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Third, the geographical distance
between headquarters and system-affiliated nursing facilities can increase monitoring
costs (Giroud , 2013) and again, leads to more agency problems. Thus, compared to
independent nursing facilities, system-affiliated nursing homes should be more likely
to adopt performance-based compensation in contracting their managers.
H 4: System-affiliated nursing homes are more likely to adopt performance-based
compensation to alleviate agency problems.
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data availability presents the biggest challenge in a study of managers’ com-
pensation in mixed ownership industries. Particularly in the health care sector,
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most for-profit providers are not publicly traded companies, and therefore, complete
establishment-level compensation information is unavailable to researchers. Previous
studies use either a rare single-year survey (Ballou and Weisbrod , 2003; Roomkin and
Weisbrod , 1999) or IRS form I-990 (Bricklye et al., 2010) and confine the scope to
only not-for-profit organizations. Two studies by Preyra and Pink (2001) and Reiter
et al. (2009) use a small sample of non-profit hospitals in Ontario. Overall, the main
limitation of previous studies is that they are not able to compare directly the man-
agers’ compensation of for-profits to those of not-for-profits. To overcome these data
limitations, I obtain a unique eight year (2003-2010) dataset that provides detailed
manager characteristics and compensation for all for-profit and not-for-profit nursing
homes in Ohio. The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services collects an annual
cost report from every nursing home that receives state Medicaid reimbursement.
Because this dataset contains information for both for-profit and not-for-profit nurs-
ing homes, I am able to compare directly the compensation and incentive structures
between for-profits and not-for-profits.
4.3.1 Manager Characteristics and Compensation
To exclude interim managers, I only include managers who worked at least
200 days during the fiscal year under examination. To account for the potential re-
porting errors, I also exclude the observations with the top 5% and bottom 5% values
of compensation, assets, profit margins, and ROA. The compensation number is ad-
justed to year 2000 dollars using the consumer price index. Because nursing homes
convert their ownership status (for-profit or not-for-profit) for reasons that may not
be observable, I also exclude nursing homes that have converted their ownership sta-
tus during the study period (2003-2010). 1 Table 4.1 shows the basic descriptive
1The conversion between for-profit and not-for-profit status implies a potential selection problem.
If the conversions mostly happen to financially destressed not-for-profits, I may under-estimate the
association between compensation and financial performance at not-for-profits.
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statistics. The mean manager compensation is $94,043, and on average, these man-
agers work 36.96 hours per week. To account for the concerns that managers may not
be employed full-time, I include a binary variable that indicates whether the man-
agers work at least 40 hours per week. About 27.87% of the managers work fewer
than 40 hours per week. In the regression analysis, I also exclude the nursing homes
that are located within hospitals or those owned by the government, because those
nursing homes can be very different from most for-profit and not-for-profit nursing
homes. Among the managers, 91% earned a bachelor degree and have 8.79 years of
work experience in a health care-related field. In addition, 14.5% of them are also
the owners of the nursing homes. Table 4.2 provides more detailed information about
several sub-groups. Among the for-profits, on average, managers who are non-owners
earn $93,534, and owner-managers earn $105,615 annually. On the other hand, not-
for-profit managers only earn $87,546 each year, which is $18,609 or 20.63% lower
than owner-managers do. System affiliation has very limited effects on managers’
compensation. The nursing homes that have a higher percentage of revenue from
Medicaid residents pay their managers 4.4% less than those that focus on Medicare
and private residents. I also reported managers’ work hours. On average, managers
at not-for-profits work 35.55 hours per week, and non-owner managers work 37.43
hours each week. Managers of system-affiliated nursing homes work 37.32 hours per
week, 0.9 more hours than those at independent nursing homes.
Although it is interesting to compare the work hours of managers in different
organizational forms, there are several concerns about proceeding with the empirical
analysis. First, more than half of the managers report that they work 40 hours a
week. It is not clear whether this total is reported at 40 for convenience, the data
is top censored at 40, or managers actually work for 40 hours. Second, it might be
possible that the managers provide administration at several small nursing homes and
split their time among all of the facilities. Third, work hours are endogenous to com-
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pensation. Therefore, because of the concerns about data quality and endogeneity, I
only report work hours as the supportive information.
Two other important manager characteristics are educational background and
years of work experience. Owner-managers are less likely to have a bachelor degree –
only 79% compared to the sample mean of 91%. Years of work experience are reported
in continuous numbers and capped at 10 years. Owner-managers and not-for-profit
managers are more experienced, with 9.33 and 9.29 years of related experience, com-
pared to 8.55 years of non-owner managers. Compared to independent nursing homes,
managers who work at system-affiliated homes are more likely to have bachelor’s de-
grees but are slightly less experienced.
4.3.2 Performance Measures
I use two financial and four quality measures to empirically test whether
managers’ compensation is tied to financial and altruistic motives. These measures
are aggregated at the facility level.
4.3.2.1 Financial Measure
Among many financial measures, I use both the profit margin and ratio of
return on assets (ROA) as the primary proxies for financial performance. The profit
margin is defined as net income divided by total revenues and it measures the prof-
itability of the firm. The average profit margin is 3.26%. The second financial mea-
sure, ROA, has been widely used in prior research that studies managers’ compen-
sation (Parrino, 1997; Bertrand and Schoar , 2003). Return on assets is defined as
the net profits over total assets; this term captures profitability and then scales the




I use four common quality measures as proxies for managers’ performance on
quality of care. These measures are the health deficiencies identified by inspectors,
prevalence of restraint, prevalence of pressure sores, and nurse hours per patient day.
Quality measures are extracted from the CMS’ Nursing Home Compare (NHC) web-
site. The website comprises comprehensive quality measures for all Medicare-certified
nursing homes. These quality measures are widely applied in literature that examines
nursing home quality. Data about inspection deficiency measures are available since
year 2001, and other quality measures are available from 2003 to 2010. Every 12-15
months, state health personnel inspect all nursing homes and report any deficiencies
and their severity. To account for the severity of each health deficiency, I weight
each deficiency according to its severity (from 1 to 12) and create a Deficiency Score
variable that aggregates all severity-weighted deficiencies; the higher the deficiency
score, the lower the quality. Other quality measures are reported quarterly, and I
use the fourth-quarter figures to proxy the latest quality level in each year. High
prevalence of restraint use and pressure sores in general represents low quality. On
average, 5.38% of the residents are physically restrained, and 9.52% of the residents
have pressure sores. I also create dummy variables that indicate the observations
with the missing value of each quality measure. In calculating the nurse hours per
patient day, there are four different staffing hours, which include Registered Nurses
(RN) hours per patient day, Licensed Vocational Nurses hours per patient day (LVN),
Certificated Nurse Aides (CNA) hours per patient day, and total nurse hours per pa-
tient day. The total nurse hours per patient day are 3.69. I use the Medicare provider
number to merge managers’ compensation and the corresponding quality measures.
91
4.3.3 Other Important Independent Variables
Online Survey and Certification and Reporting (OSCAR), Ohio nursing home
cost report, and NHC dataset also provide several important nursing home-level and
market-level control variables. Nursing home ownership types, number of beds, payer
mix, and system affiliation are the key variables that are important enough to spark
their own discussions. For-profit nursing homes represent 82.3% of those in the sam-
ple, and about 15.1% are not-for-profit. The median nursing home has 103.2 beds,
and 59.8% of the nursing homes are affiliated with multi-facility systems. For the
payer mix, an average nursing home receives 65.6% of its revenue from Medicaid,
22.3% from private payers, and the rest from Medicare. The average number of ac-
tivities of daily living (ADLs) provides a facility-level proxy to account for different
patient case mixes. It measures whether residents can be independent in the activi-
ties including bathing, dressing, transferring, toilet use, and eating. The higher the
average number of ADLs, the more assistance for daily care the patients/residents in
the nursing facilities require. The average number of ADLs is 5.34.
Market-level covariates include for-profit market shares, HHI index, median
household income, and the population (in thousands) above 65 years old per square
mile. In an earlier work, Nyman (1994) points out that 80% of Wisconsin nursing
home residents enter the nursing homes located in the counties where they reside.
Thus, I use county as the primary definition of the nursing home market. The market
share is calculated as the ratio of the number of nursing home beds over the sum
of nursing home beds in each county. Within an average market, for-profit nursing
homes account for 81% of the market share, with a standard deviation of 28.3%. To
control for the intensity of market competition, I construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) by summarizing the squares of nursing home market shares in each
county. The calculation of HHI is not adjusted for system-level market share because
the unique system identifier is not available in the dataset. I also include the county
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adjustment variable that is included in the compensation report form.
4.3.4 Empirical Specification
4.3.4.1 Baseline Model
I use both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and nursing home fixed-effect
models to analyze the level and the change of managers’ compensation. Because the
current year’s compensation likely reflects last year’s performance, all performance
and nursing home level variables are lagged by one year. Both OLS and fixed-effect
models have their own advantages. The results from the OLS regressions provide
important information of nursing home-level variables that do not change frequently.
On the other hand, nursing home fixed effects can account for time-invariant vari-
ables that are not observable or are not available in the dataset, such as corporate
governance and corporate culture. The baseline OLS specification is described as:
Yi,t = βNFPi+µOwneri,t+δPerformancei,t−1+γManageri,t+λNHi,t−1+θMm,t+T+εi,t
(4.1)
Where Yi,t represents two outcomes of interest, the level and the change of managers’
annualized compensation. NFPi is the indicator variable for whether the nursing
home is not-for-profit and Owner is one if the managers are also the owners. Thus,
the regression compares three types of managers: not-for-profit managers, owner-
managers, and the omitted (reference) group of non-owner managers. Government-
owned nursing homes are excluded from the analysis, because managers at these
nursing homes may earn different compensation and benefits and have distinct ca-
reer paths and risks. I also lag the performance and nursing home-level variables by
one year, because managers’ compensation may be based on previous performance.
Performance includes the measures of the nursing home financial and quality perfor-
mance. I also analyze correlations to examine whether the quality measures are highly
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correlated. As it is shown in Table 4.3, quality measures are not highly correlated,
so I include all measures in the regressions. Manager represents the manager-level
characteristics including an indicator variable indicating whether the manager has a
bachelor degree and a continuous variable of the managers’ years of work experience
in a related field. NH is a vector of nursing home characteristics including size (num-
ber of beds), system affiliation, occupancy rate, and the payer mix among Medicaid,
Medicare, and private payers. M represents the market level characteristics, such as
for-profit market shares, HHI concentration level, and demographic variables (median
household income) for market m in year t. I use county as the definition of the local
market. T represents the year dummy variables that control for year-fixed effects.
4.4 Results and Discussions
Among not-for-profit managers, owner-managers, and non-owner managers,
I find that owner-managers earn significantly higher compensation than managers
in the other two groups. The magnitude is as large as 22%. However, I do not
find the significant difference in compensation between not-for-profit managers and
non-owner managers. Surprisingly, I find that compensation is not tied to either
financial or quality performance in most model specifications. Rather, compensation
is statistically significantly correlated with several observable manager and nursing
home characteristics, including work experience, occupancy rate, and payer mix.
4.4.1 Compensation
Table 4.4 shows the relationship between compensation and key variables.
For the performance variables, I find that both the profit margin and ROA are pos-
itively correlated with compensation in three of four specifications. However, the
coefficients are not statistically significant. More surprisingly, there is no consistent
and significant relationship between managers’ compensation and quality measures.
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Among quality measures, the number of nurse hours per patient day could be viewed
as either a quality or an efficiency measure. From a societal view, having more nurse
hours can be considered a positive sign of high quality of care. However, from the
organizations’ perspective, higher nurse hours can be viewed as operating inefficiency.
These opposing interpretations of nurse hours might explain the insignificance find-
ings of nurse hours and compensation. Two manager characteristics, the managers’
ownership and experience, are both positively and significantly correlated with their
compensation. Owner-managers earn about 22% more compensation than not-for-
profit managers and non-owner managers. One standard deviation lower of work
experience (2.3 years) is associated with about 4.9% lower compensation.
Among the firm-level variables, occupancy rate, number of beds, and payer mix
are the most influential variables. Consistent with prior studies (Ballou and Weisbrod ,
2003), firm size is an important factor in determining the compensation level. Sur-
prisingly, there is no difference in compensation between not-for-profit and non-owner
managers. This evidence suggests that the difference in compensation between for-
profit and not-for-profit managers may result from the presence of owner-managers.
I will discuss owner-managers more in a later section. The OLS results suggest that
larger nursing homes pay their managers’ higher compensation, but the fixed-effect
model suggests that the change of the number of nursing home beds is negatively
related to compensation. In terms of payer mix, the different payer mix among
Medicaid, Medicare, or private payers imply that the nursing homes target different
product market segments and therefore require managers to have different skills and
abilities. Particularly, Medicare covers post-acute for 90 days, and residents engaging
in this care often require more complicated services and special rehabilitations. Also,
Medicare patients are more profitable than Medicaid residents, and hence, the nurs-
ing homes may be more willing to hire more expensive and capable managers. The
results suggest that managers of nursing homes with higher Medicare revenue share
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receive significantly higher compensation than those with higher private-pay revenue
share and Medicaid revenue share.
4.4.2 Pay-for-Performance
Among all specifications, I find no consistent relationship between compensa-
tion and either financial or quality performance. Table 4.4 shows the results from the
baseline models. To further test the hypothesis that for-profits place more emphasis
on financial performance and not-for-profits may emphasize quality more, I include
the interaction term of not-for-profit and performance measures. The results are re-
ported in Table 4.5. Again, I find that compensation of managers in not-for-profits
is not consistently tied to either financial or quality performance. Overall, I find
that in the nursing home industry, managers’ compensation does not reflect common
financial and quality measures. The results are consistent with the literature (Holm-
strom and Milgrom, 1991;Preyra and Pink , 2001) that firms are more reluctant to use
performance-based incentives when the managers are contracted over several tasks,
especially when some of them are difficult to measure. In fact, both profitability and
quality performance include factors that are out of managers’ control. For example,
labor costs may increase or decrease across business cycles, and Medicare and Med-
icaid may adjust their reimbursement rates time by time. In terms of quality, only
technical quality measures are included in the analysis. It is possible that resident
satisfaction and other dimensions of quality are also the important variables that are
not included in the analysis. On the other hand, I find that managers’ compensation
is positively correlated with the occupancy rate in both OLS and fixed-effect models.




In the owner-manager analysis, I include the interaction terms between owner
and all performance measures. The results are presented in Table 4.6. First, owner-
managers earn 22% higher compensation. This result supports the private benefits
hypothesis that owner-managers have stronger influence than non-owner managers
in determining their own compensation. However, consistent with the discussion of
the main analysis, I do not find a distinct relationship between compensation and
performance.
There is also an alternative hypothesis that owner-managers have better abil-
ities and thus, earn higher compensation. Because I only include bachelor degree
and years of experience to proxy for managers’ abilities, there might be other un-
observable abilities (Kaplan et al., 2012) that bias the results. For example, if owner-
managers systematically have better abilities, the observed compensation differential
actually reflects the different abilities between good and poor managers. However,
I am not able to examine this alternative hypothesis because there is no exogenous
shock that alters managers’ ownership status.
4.4.4 Product Market Competition
The results of product market competition and managers’ compensation are
presented in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. I use two measures to define the intensity
of product market competition. For-profit market share is the first measure. In the
health services research literature (Hirth, 1999; Horwitz and Nichols , 2009), for-profit
market share is viewed as a proxy of the intensity of competition on financial dimen-
sion. A dummy variable, low competition, is 1 if the for-profit market share is below
100 % and otherwise is 0. Table 4.7 shows that the for-profit market does not have
significant effects on the level and the incentives of managers’ compensation. Because
more than half of the nursing homes reside in the markets with only for-profit nurs-
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ing homes, it is of concern that there are not enough variations to provide sufficient
statistical power. Future work to include states with more not-for-profit presence will
be an interesting extension.
For the second measure, I use the conventional HHI index. I classify the mar-
kets as low competition if their HHI is larger than the median (0.25). The results
are presented in Table 4.8. In terms of the level of compensation, there is a con-
sistent and positive connection between competition and compensation. The result
favors the competition for managerial skills hypothesis that compensation increases
when the market becomes more competitive. However, because the coefficients are
not statistically significant, the results are only suggestive. One limitation is that the
calculation of HHI is not adjusted for the system affiliation. Given that more than
half of nursing homes belong to multi-facility chains, an analysis that uses system-
affiliation-adjusted HHI might provide more robust results.
In addition, an alternative explanation of the insignificant relationship between
competition and managers’ incentives is that the effect of product market competi-
tion is non-monotonic. As pointed out by Schmidt (1997), competition can reduce
managerial slack but the relation is not necessary to be monotonic. The marginal re-
duction of managerial slack can increases when the incumbents faces new entrants and
decreases when the market becomes perfectly competitive. Thus, performance-based
incentives can be more likely to be adopted in both the least and most competitive
markets, and less likely to be adopted in the intermediated competitive market. In
the future research, it will be interesting to have more formal discussions and exami-
nations of the non-monotonic competition effect on managerial incentives.
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4.4.5 System-Affiliation
In the sample, about 59.8% of the nursing homes belong to multi-facility sys-
tems. To examine whether managers in system-affiliated nursing homes are more
likely to have performance-based compensation (Hypothesis 4), I include the inter-
action term of system-affiliation and performance measures in the regression. The
results are reported in Table 4.9. I find that managers in system-affiliated nurs-
ing facilities do not earn statistically significantly different compensation than those
who work in independent nursing homes. I also find that system-affiliated managers
are not more likely to receive performance-based compensation. Overall, I find that
system affiliation does not have a significant effect on managers’ compensation.
4.4.6 Limitations and Extensions
There are two major limitations of this study. First, I do not include the
managers’ tenure and turnover in the analysis, and these two variables can potentially
cause omitted variable biases. It is likely that performance is reflected in managers’
turnover but not in their compensation. Also, compensation might be positively
correlated with tenure in the same firm. If not-for-profit managers tend to stay in the
same organization for a longer period, the compensation for not-for-profit managers
may be over-estimated. However, in the Ohio dataset, the computation of tenure and
turnover is feasible but very time-consuming because there are no unique manager
identifiers. I plan to code these manager identifiers and incorporate them in the future
study. Second, the compensation information does not separate the composition
between base salaries and stock bonus. For the privately held nursing homes, without
the market value of the stock bonus, the actual compensation that includes stock
bonus can be potentially higher than it is reflected in the data. Furthermore, the
convex payoff of stock options can incentivize managers focus more about profitability
than other objectives. It is also possible that performance is tied to the composition
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of compensation and not the overall level of the compensation. Although Cole and
Mehran (2008) points out that only very few privately held small firms issue stock
options, there are nursing homes belonging to national chains which operate more
than 200 nursing homes nationally (for example, Genesis HealthCare and Golden
Living). Compensation of managers in nursing homes that belong to large systems is
more likely to include stock bonuses. Unfortunately, such data are not available for
the nursing home cost reports from the major state agencies.
Future research should also expand the scope of studies from Ohio to other
states, including California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York.
Because of the strictness of Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws and the differing for-profit
penetration rates by state, the incorporation of multiple major states can provide
more market-level variations to examine the interaction between the product market
structure and managers’ compensation.
4.5 Conclusion
The primary goal of this paper is to use a novel dataset of managers’ compen-
sation to provide empirical evidence that for-profit and not-for-profit organizations
place different emphasis on financial and altruistic motives. This paper also examines
the difference between owner-managers and non-owner managers. Surprisingly, I find
that compensation is not consistently related to either financial or quality measures.
Therefore, no evidence supports the hypothesis that not-for-profits place more weight
on altruistic performance in determining managers’ compensation. However, the re-
sults should be interpreted with caution. The insignificant findings do not necessarily
imply that not-for-profits do not have altruistic motives. It is possible that the mea-
sures used in this paper are too noisy to reflect the managers’ contribution and thus
are not adopted as the evaluation benchmarks. As shown in the results, compensation
is tied to some other measures, such as occupancy rate and managers’ experience.
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On the other hand, I find that owner-managers earn significantly higher com-
pensation than not-for-profit and for-profit/non-owner managers do. The difference
is as large as 22% of the average annual compensation. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that owner-managers can exercise their influence to collect private
benefits. It raises a corporate governance issue for smaller health services providers.
About 14.9% of observations in the sample are owner-managers. It is possible that
owner-managers also have significant presence in other health services industries in
which small-medium firms are the dominant organizational forms. Because owner-
managers have more substantial financial interests and also have stronger influence
on firms’ policies, it is of great interest to examine whether owner-managers are more
likely to trade-off public welfare for personal benefit, when they face adverse events.
This issue is left for future research to explore.
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Figure 4.1: The Distribution of Annualized Compensation by For-Profit Status
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Min Median Max Std N
Manager-Level
Annual Compensation 94,043 20,549 90,662 197,464 31,611 4767
Weekly Work Hours 36.964 16.060 40 40 6.030 4767
Bachelor Degree 0.909 0 1 1 0.288 4767
Years of Work Experience 8.794 0 10 10 2.348 4767
Owner 0.145 0 0 1 0.352 4767
Performance Measures
Profit Margin (%) 3.256 -16.859 3.542 17.681 6.465 4767
Return on Assets (%) 9.698 -59.968 6.638 81.224 22.131 4767
Deficiency Score 21.876 0.000 17 210 20.428 4767
Restraint (%) 5.382 0 4 45 6.025 4767
Restraint NA 0.038 0 0 1 0.190 4767
Pressure Sores (%) 9.518 0 9 42 7.554 4767
Pressure Sores NA 0.202 0 0 1 0.402 4767
Nurse Hrs per Day 3.692 0 3.66 18.7 0.917 4767
Nurse Hrs NA 0.023 0 0 1 0.150 4767
Nursing Home-Level
For-Profit 0.823 0 1 1 0.382 4767
Private-Pay Shr 0.223 0.000 0.212 1.000 0.128 4681
Medicaid-Pay Shr 0.656 0.000 0.661 1.000 0.154 4681
Avg. ADL 5.335 1.862 5.331 8.957 0.774 4681
Government Owned 0.026 0 0 1 0.160 4767
Hospital Based 0.003 0 0 1 0.050 4767
System Affiliated 0.598 0 1 1 0.490 4767
Occupancy Rate 87.522 1 90 100 11.788 4676
Number of Beds 103.203 18 100 351 43.615 4681
Market-Level
For-Profit Mkt Shr 0.810 0.000 1.000 1 0.283 4767
000’ 65+/ square mile 0.121 0.004 0.054 0.454 0.130 4767
HHI 0.411 0.060 0.301 1.000 0.299 4767
Median Income 44,651 27,849 44,093 88,645 7,406 4767
Note: Private-pay share, Medicaid-pay share, avg. ADL, occupancy rate, and number of beds are 1
year lagged values and thus have fewer observations.
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Table 4.2: Compensation and Manager Characteristics by Sub-groups
Mean Std Min Median Max N
Compensation ($)
Overall 94,406 31,841 20,549 91,199 197,464 4644
Not-For-Profit 87,546 27,279 23,113 85,249 196,943 718
For-Profit: Owner 105,615 40,180 22,858 101,549 196,485 691
For-Profit: Non-Owner 93,534 30,134 20,549 91,550 197,464 3235
System-Affiliated 94,116 30,113 21,896 91,890 197,464 2852
Not-System-Affiliated 94,866 34,416 20,549 90,366 196,943 1792
More Medicaid Shr 92,515 32,004 20,549 89,031 196,222 2477
Fewer Medicaid Shr 96,566 31,523 22,213 93,155 197,464 2167
Weekly Work Hrs
Overall 36.97 6.04 16.06 40.00 40.00 4644
Not-For-Profit 35.55 6.02 16.06 40.00 40.00 718
For-Profit: Owner 36.32 6.67 16.59 40.00 40.00 691
For-Profit: Non-Owner 37.43 5.85 16.31 40.00 40.00 3235
System-Affiliated 37.32 5.85 16.06 40.00 40.00 2852
Not-System-Affiliated 36.42 6.30 16.59 40.00 40.00 1792
More Medicaid Shr 37.07 6.14 16.31 40.00 40.00 2477
Fewer Medicaid Shr 36.87 5.93 16.06 40.00 40.00 2167
Bachelor Degree
Overall 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 4644
Not-For-Profit 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00 718
For-Profit: Owner 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 691
For-Profit: Non-Owner 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 3235
System-Affiliated 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 2852
Not-System-Affiliated 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 1792
More Medicaid Shr 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 2477
Fewer Medicaid Shr 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00 2167
Experience (Years)
Overall 8.78 2.36 0.00 10.00 10.00 4644
Not-For-Profit 9.33 1.73 0.00 10.00 10.00 718
For-Profit: Owner 9.29 1.88 0.00 10.00 10.00 691
For-Profit: Non-Owner 8.55 2.53 0.00 10.00 10.00 3235
System-Affiliated 8.57 2.49 0.00 10.00 10.00 2852
Not-System-Affiliated 9.12 2.09 0.00 10.00 10.00 1792
More Medicaid Shr 8.59 2.55 0.00 10.00 10.00 2477
Fewer Medicaid Shr 9.00 2.09 0.00 10.00 10.00 2167
Note: The reported statistics do not include managers in government-owned nursing homes.
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Table 4.3: Correlation Between Quality Measures
Restraint Pressure Sores Deficiencies Nurse Hours
Restraint 1.000
Pressure Sores 0.045 1.000
Deficiencies 0.066 0.110 1.000
Nurse Hours -0.028 -0.017 -0.078 1.000
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Managers’ Compensation
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
Performance
Profit Margin t−1 45.8 176.90** -26.67 6.52
[60.18] [73.88] [49.80] [90.16]
ROA t−1 0.28 1.26 2.87*** -0.74
[2.48] [1.73] [0.84] [1.42]
Restraint t−1 -116.35 -79.29 167.68* -14.08
[98.61] [142.10] [89.35] [333.99]
Pressure Sores t−1 -52.05 -12.55 30.18 136.440
[84.72] [122.81] [70.82] [127.89]
Deficiencies t−1 -14.66 -40.59 4.75 -13.38
[22.45] [39.78] [19.37] [44.84]
Nurse Hours/Day t−1 -1788.85** 778.78 227.49 -278.29
[858.51] [686.91] [434.68] [863.50]
Manager Characteristics
Owner 20533.85*** 807.7 24114.18*** 17630.81**
[3415.41] [1984.62] [5058.29] [6980.07]
Bachelor Degree -1911.98 -2344.04 -3457.12 -3670.73
[3109.77] [2376.44] [3162.85] [4866.42]
Experience (Years) 2150.45*** 1225.94*** 2088.60*** 1784.37***




System-Affiliation t−1 964.56 -1695.69 1362.86 2669.62
[1735.81] [1370.68] [1714.36] [3304.79]
Occupancy Rate t−1 110.15** 3.18 156.88*** 43.41
[53.12] [68.60] [52.26] [78.64]
Number of Beds t−1 245.30*** -3.95 100.37* -131.53*
[23.54] [23.20] [57.85] [70.85]
Private-Pay Share t−1 -25533.14*** 12580.25 -6212.34 -22647.19*
[9153.88] [10958.40] [7048.13] [11744.74]
Medicaid-Pay Share t−1 -37129.32*** 17908.66* -4377.01 -3443.17
[8131.56] [10164.90] [6636.55] [10828.45]
Avg. # of ADLs t−1 -893.4 -144.14 -1765.19** -193.98
[906.73] [751.74] [694.93] [1266.37]
R-Squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
N 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions control for the year-fixed effects, managers’ functions, for-profit market share, HHI, county
level income, percentage of population above 65 years old, county adjustment, and indicators of missing quality
measures, full-time managers, and solo managers.
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Table 4.5: Effects of Not-For-Profit Status on Compensation Incentives
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not-For-Profit -3421 2233.03
[6334.117] [6691.450]
Profit Margin t−1 37.57 222.33*** -80.29 -24.39
[57.934] [83.175] [65.223] [127.327]
Not-For-Profit X Profit Margin t−1 -42.7 -314.45** -67.64 -359.11
[226.347] [127.728] [175.681] [255.118]
ROA t−1 0.04 -0.57 3.43*** -0.95
[1.827] [0.864] [0.949] [1.676]
Not-For-Profit X ROA t−1 6.73 198.00*** 93.12 287.07**
[92.238] [70.160] [67.216] [132.691]
Restraint t−1 -161.26 -155.66 151.24* -121.07
[98.338] [184.222] [91.774] [440.780]
Not-For-Profit X Restraint t−1 170.95 300.73 -123.13 387.8
[208.015] [225.411] [213.623] [446.762]
Pressure Sores t−1 -119.06 -64.56 -25.59 108.69
[100.684] [159.540] [78.578] [154.679]
Not-For-Profit X Pressure Sores t−1 80.57 -15.8 50.58 -83.61
[182.383] [228.915] [128.792] [265.226]
Deficiencies t−1 -25.31 -56.59 -16.45 -40.59
[21.049] [52.504] [22.187] [55.160]
Not-For-Profit X Deficiencies t−1 -64.94 17.04 -7.69 22.84
[69.227] [93.622] [56.523] [90.286]
Nurse Hrs t−1 -1100.05 1182.92 438.58 -717.07
[1040.419] [889.028] [560.783] [1222.960]
Not-For-Profit X Nurse Hrs t−1 -139.89 -684.45 476.7 1317.7
[1332.585] [980.739] [693.432] [1256.420]
R-squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
Observations 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions include all independent variables in the Table 4.
Note (4) The reference group is the for-profit/non-owner manager
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Table 4.6: Effects of Owner-Managers on Compensation Incentives
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Owner 31096.65** 3322.77 25859.05** 10396.77
[13796.264] [8730.351] [11941.509] [17054.298]
Profit Margin t−1 37.57 222.33*** -80.29 -24.39
[57.934] [83.175] [65.223] [127.327]
Owner X Profit Margin t−1 23.25 -168.92* 138.83 111.77
[132.066] [99.646] [147.954] [177.937]
ROA t−1 0.04 -0.57 3.43*** -0.95
[1.827] [0.864] [0.949] [1.676]
Owner X ROA t−1 41.98 46.88 -9.3 12.46
[49.752] [32.597] [38.354] [55.275]
Restraint t−1 -161.26 -155.66 151.24* -121.07
[98.338] [184.222] [91.774] [440.780]
Owner X Restraint t−1 104.06 228.37 270 281.33
[479.873] [245.328] [404.159] [516.703]
Pressure Sores t−1 -119.06 -64.56 -25.59 108.69
[100.684] [159.540] [78.578] [154.679]
Owner X Pressure Sores t−1 349.11 395.95 292.15 304.47
[284.898] [240.960] [278.224] [347.591]
Deficiencies t−1 -25.31 -56.59 -16.45 -40.59
[21.049] [52.504] [22.187] [55.160]
Owner X Deficiencies t−1 129.64 104.11 137.45** 166.81
[97.806] [90.357] [57.847] [103.376]
Nurse Hrs t−1 -1100.05 1182.92 438.58 -717.07
[1040.419] [889.028] [560.783] [1222.960]
Owner X Nurse Hrs t−1 -5279.12* -2354.28 -2937.27 418.82
[2891.530] [1614.222] [2660.039] [3557.031]
R-squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
Observations 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions include all independent variables in the Table 4.
Note (4) The reference group are the for-profit/non-owner managers.
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Table 4.7: Market Competition (For-profit Market Share) and Managers’ Compensa-
tion
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LC(Low Competition) -4984.51 7134.98 -6615.58 10620.87
[5913.956] [5713.918] [4154.405] [8920.482]
Profit Margin t−1 54.24 229.46** -28.15 68.54
[85.383] [97.304] [81.071] [146.261]
LC X Profit Margin t−1 -12.85 -74.25 2.17 -77.72
[93.877] [104.501] [97.285] [169.364]
ROA t−1 0.13 0.34 2.58*** -0.9
[2.446] [1.160] [0.762] [1.448]
LC X ROA t−1 0.97 4.45 4.41 -9.22
[11.778] [13.759] [8.228] [20.943]
Restraint t−1 -77.86 55.47 170.4 82.02
[122.236] [107.296] [111.686] [244.403]
LC X Restraint t−1 -107.92 -349.76 28.28 -170.52
[167.709] [292.723] [150.743] [506.522]
Pressure Sores t−1 -202.89* -39.37 -32.59 130.38
[119.064] [102.562] [93.727] [140.341]
LC X Pressure Sores t−1 341.22** 60.25 141.93 37.1
[156.479] [178.117] [133.335] [229.886]
Deficiencies t−1 -0.13 4.79 -13.61 39.1
[34.780] [39.616] [26.519] [50.969]
LC X Deficiencies t−1 -29.98 -91.11 39.17 -121.03
[55.747] [70.171] [37.810] [87.803]
Nurse Hrs t−1 -2188.08* 1616.42** -57.04 817.11
[1239.571] [707.391] [563.591] [948.719]
LC X Nurse Hrs t−1 955.77 -1745.93 664.66 -2142.33
[1443.432] [1161.335] [742.271] [1751.668]
R-squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
Observations 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions include all independent variables in the Table 4.
Note (4) The reference group are nursing homes that locates in high competition markets. High/low competition is
defined as if for-market share is above or below median.
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Table 4.8: Market Competition (HHI Index) and Managers’ Compensation
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LC(Low Competition) -7711.28 -7669.05 -1365.37 -9575.52
[5634.737] [6684.483] [4113.476] [9549.632]
Profit Margin t−1 67.13 123.51* -114.99* -52.25
[76.595] [73.116] [68.615] [112.873]
LC X Profit Margin t−1 -36.18 105.15 166.56* 106.22
[112.245] [81.052] [87.369] [144.299]
ROA t−1 -10.13 0.49 0.34 -9.06
[7.791] [10.312] [6.134] [13.756]
LC X ROA t−1 11.5 -0.08 2.02 8.45
[8.025] [10.579] [6.215] [13.929]
Restraint t−1 -243.04* -353.74 218.63* -161.15
[123.830] [307.935] [116.850] [608.091]
LC X Restraint t−1 206.3 454.09 -63.7 230.04
[152.451] [296.203] [119.302] [465.593]
Pressure Sores t−1 -108.29 -141.1 -49.37 -83.63
[129.398] [236.752] [112.672] [221.962]
LC X Pressure Sores t−1 94.8 204.4 132.57 354.44
[144.005] [225.684] [128.281] [237.943]
Deficiencies t−1 -2.79 -71.21 27.19 -72.03
[46.518] [72.559] [27.761] [85.988]
LC X Deficiencies t−1 -20.5 56.92 -39.38 103.05
[58.950] [78.440] [32.902] [119.511]
Nurse Hrs t−1 -2627.72** 280.34 294.96 -1295.52
[1174.265] [1393.422] [825.777] [1979.645]
LC X Nurse Hrs t−1 1297.39 888.32 -11.79 1647.9
[1302.035] [1378.836] [923.472] [2019.863]
R-squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
Observations 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions include all independent variables in the Table 4.
Note (4) The reference group are nursing homes that locates in high competition markets. High/low competition is
defined as HHI index above or below median.
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Table 4.9: Effect of System Affiliation on Compensation Incentives
OLS Nursing Home FE
$ ∆ $ $ ∆ $
(1) (2) (3) (4)
System t−1 -1579.43 4756.99 -371.3 13629.79
[7099.136] [7636.708] [4290.322] [8317.552]
Profit Margin t−1 122.07* 87.3 35.34 19.13
[70.349] [80.110] [66.792] [90.912]
System t−1 X Profit Margin t−1 -180.54** 155.57 -123.87 17.33
[86.709] [126.454] [87.032] [150.818]
ROA t−1 50.66** 9.91 14.35 -51.98
[24.388] [37.811] [18.179] [32.352]
System t−1 X ROA t−1 -50.76** -9.95 -11.2 51.93
[24.655] [38.211] [18.205] [32.395]
Restraint t−1 -317.78 -158.11 111.67 -171.57
[217.708] [146.866] [146.466] [246.758]
System t−1 X Restraint t−1 307.39 110.67 94.79 230.13
[238.011] [224.040] [165.508] [552.186]
Pressure Sores t−1 -78.14 155.96 53.86 290.38
[153.289] [160.398] [121.454] [222.382]
System t−1 X Pressure Sores t−1 50.47 -282.22 -44.93 -230.81
[174.682] [197.215] [150.309] [288.678]
Deficiencies t−1 -13.95 2.04 5.92 22.8
[39.779] [41.953] [31.149] [46.573]
System t−1 X Deficiencies t−1 -3.18 -63.74 -1.79 -56.08
[44.747] [73.992] [39.360] [73.628]
Nurse Hrs t−1 -2059.64 1256.13* -24.59 1073.29
[1361.443] [722.175] [612.062] [844.551]
System t−1 X Nurse Hrs t−1 452.53 -875.18 425.68 -2434.18
[1585.892] [1321.311] [847.148] [1651.699]
R-squared 0.42 0.02 0.33 0.02
Observations 4543 4541 4543 4541
Note (1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels
Note (2) For OLS, standard errors are clustered at the county level; I use robust standard error for nursing home
fixed-effect models.
Note (3) All regresions include all independent variables in the Table 4.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This dissertation examines three topics related to the interaction of financial
arrangements and production decisions in health care organizations; specifically, the
dynamics of nursing home quality across business cycles, financial leverage and hospi-
tal technology adoption, and managers compensation in mixed ownership industries.
The universal theme among these three essays aim to investigate the link between
financial and operational decisions and provide empirical evidence on welfare gains
or losses resulting from finance decisions.
The results detailed in the second chapter provide consistent evidence that
nursing home quality is counter-cyclical; quality improves during recessions and de-
teriorates during booms. I theorize that the fluctuation of labor market and the
relatively rigid public reimbursement are two important mechanisms that result in
counter-cyclical quality. Furthermore, I investigate whether nursing homes financial
leverage can amplify the counter-cyclical fluctuation of quality. While financial lever-
age is consistently and significantly associated with quality, the interaction term of
leverage and business cycles is not always significant. This chapter provides theoret-
ical arguments and empirical evidence that nursing home quality is counter-cyclical;
however, it requires further study to clarify the causality between financial leverage
and quality.
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The third chapter attempts to provide empirical evidence of the impacts of
financial leverage on technology adoption. The research design uses the California
Seismic Retrofit Mandate as an exogenous financial shock that crowds out hospitals
financial resources. Surprisingly, I find no significant relationship between financial
leverage and the adoption of radiology technology. However, it is difficult to inter-
pret the nonsignificant results because of the small sample size. Thus, I recommend
incorporating more hospitals in multiple states for future study.
The fourth chapter examines whether nursing home managers are compen-
sated differentially among three different identities, not-for-profit, for-profit and non-
owner, and for-profit and owner. The results show that managers compensation is
not tied to their performance. Rather, their compensation is associated more so with
concrete measures including the size of nursing home, payer-mix, and managers ex-
perience. Among three types of managers, owner-managers earn significantly higher
compensation than do non-owner managers and not-for-profit managers. Compensa-
tion of non-owner managers is not significantly different from that of not-for-profit
managers. Particularly, the separation of owner-managers from the non-owners pro-
vides an alternative angle to study the difference between for-profits and not-for-
profits. Perhaps, the for-profit managers equity stakes in the organization are more
influential than is the legal definition of for-profit or not-for-profit status. Additional







A.1 Appendix A: Theoretical Proofs
A.1.1 Demand
Consumers of nursing home care are assumed to only partially observe nursing
home quality. β represents the severity of asymmetric quality information. The
consumers are distributed uniformly between [0,1] with transportation cost t. The











Overtime, consumers gradually learn the true quality of the nursing homes and reduce
the level of information asymmetry between nursing homes and consumers. Because
it requires significant time to adjust quality and also alter quality reputation, the
model assumes quality stay the same in both the first and second periods. In the
second period, the true nursing home quality is fully revealed to the consumers so β
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is normalized to one - the assumption of perfect information. The market share in











A.1.2 Nursing Home with 100 % Internal Financing
In this simple model, I assume both nursing homes A and B are profit maximizing
and their initial start-up investments are 100 % equity financed. The firms have
sufficient internal cash-flows for operation needs and have no borrowings and debts.
The nursing home A’s maximization problem can be characterized as:






















































































Technical Note on Quality Measures
B.1 Appendix B: Technical Note on Quality Measures
This section provides definitions and explanations of the nursing home quality
measures that are used in the empirical analysis.
B.1.1 Deficiencies and Severity Weight
Nursing home inspections provide detailed deficiency information by categories
and severity. There are two broader types of deficiencies: (1) health deficiencies and
(2) life and fire deficiencies. Each inspected deficiency is assigned a letter tag from A
to L, in which A represents the mildest and L represents the most severe deficiencies.
I assign a numerical value of each letter tag and summarize the total deficiencies
scores for each nursing home. The higher the deficiencies score, the lower the quality.
B.1.2 Health Deficiencies
Health deficiencies include eight deficiency categories:(1) Mistreatment, (2) Qual-
ity Care, (3) Resident Assessment, (4) Resident Rights, (5) Nutrition and Diet, (6)
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Pharmacy Service, (7) Environment, and (8) Administration.
Examples of health deficiencies include violations of the following guidelines: hiring
only people with no legal history of abusing, neglecting, or mistreating residents ; com-
pletely assessing each resident’s assessment at least every 12 months ; and making
sure each resident receives an accurate assessment by a qualified health professional.
B.1.3 Fire and Safety Deficiencies
Fire and Safety deficiencies include 19 deficiency categories:(1) Building Con-
struction, (2) Interior Finish, (3) Corridor Walls and Doors, (4) Vertical Openings,
(5) Smoke Compartmentation and Control, (6) Hazardous Areas, (7) Exit and Exit
Access, (8) Exits and Egress, (9) Illumination and Emergency Power, (10) Emergency
Plans and Fire Drills, (11) Fire Alarm Systems, (12) Automatic Sprinkler Systems,
(13) Smoking Regulations, (14) Building Service Equipment,, (15) Furnishings and
Decorations, (16) Laboratories, (17) Medical Gases and Anesthetizing Areas, (18)
Electrical Deficiencies, and (19) Miscellaneous.
B.1.4 Severity Weighting
Each deficiency depending on its severity is assigned an alphabetic code from A to
L. The severity is the combination of the scope and the level of harm. For example,
severity is coded as A for Isolated/Potential for minimal harm, H for Pattern/Actual
harm, or L for Widespread/ Immediate jeopardy to resident health or safety. I further
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